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THE DRAINING OF DAUBERT AND THE
RECIDIVISM OF JUNK SCIENCE IN FEDERAL
AND STATE COURTS
Victor E. Schwartz* & Cary Silverman**
This Article is dedicated to a great torts scholar and lifelong friend,
the distinguished Dean of Hofstra University School of Law, Aaron
Twerski. He has inspired generations of law students and also his
friends to think and write about how to improve our system ofjustice.

I.

INTRODUCTION

There is no more important issue in the law of torts than factual
causation. If a defendant is held liable for something it did not do, then
the justice system has failed. On the other hand, if a defendant is able to
convince a jury that it did not cause an injury for which it was
responsible, that is also a miscarriage of justice. Both failures of our
*

Victor E. Schwartz is Chairman of the Public Policy Group in the Washington, D.C.,

office of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. He co-authors the most widely used torts casebook in the
United States, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS (1 th ed. 2005). He has served on the
advisory committees of the American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY, AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES projects.
Schwartz received his B.A. summa cum laude from Boston University and his J.D. magna cum
laude from Columbia University. Schwartz formerly served as Dean of the University of Cincinnati
School of Law, where he taught tort law and evidence. The concept of a "gatekeeping" role under
the Federal Rules of Evidence was first suggested in an amicus brief co-authored by Robert D.
Charrow, Esq. and Victor E. Schwartz, Esq., filed on behalf of a number of organizations. See Brief
of Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., National Association of Manufacturers, Business
Roundtable, and Chemical Manufacturers Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102), 1993 WL 13006388, at
*9 ("Given the extraordinary latitude traditionally afforded expert witnesses, courts and
commentators have long recognized the need to impose 'gateways' through which expert testimony
must pass for it to be considered useful, and ultimately admissible, at trial.").
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justice system are more likely to arise when factual causation is
entwined with scientific evidence.
In 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed this
issue head on by interpreting the impact of the Federal Rules of
Evidence on scientific causation. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court established a multi-factorbased approach to determining admissibility.' The test provided
flexibility so as to separate sound science from fiction.2 Of equal
importance, the Supreme Court deputized trial court judges as
"gatekeepers." 3 This key role placed a serious and sound obligation on
federal district court judges to protect lay jury fact finders against
unreliable scientific expert testimony.
This Article begins with a brief review of the principles and policy
underlying Daubert and its progeny. It then examines whether federal
court judges have fulfilled their responsibility to serve as gatekeepers.
We find that while most trial judges take their role as gatekeepers very
seriously 4 and closely examine expert testimony to ensure its reliability
and applicability, some have failed to follow both the letter and spirit of
Daubert. This Article examines the subsequent impact of these rulings,
finding that there is a roulette wheel randomness as to whether sound
science will indeed prevail. Looking primarily to federal court opinions
in civil litigation, the Article identifies five general areas of
inconsistency in the application of expert testimony standards that have
emerged in recent years. 5
First among the five areas of identified inconsistency is that several
courts continue to apply the broad relevance standard meant for lay
testimony to expert evidence, rather than the closer "fit" required by the
U.S. Supreme Court.
Second, some courts have misinterpreted their "flexibility" in
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
2. See Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that
while Rule 702 "was intended to liberalize the introduction of relevant expert evidence," courts
were charged with conducting a preliminary assessment as to the expert's reasoning and
methodology to assure its scientific validity and fit to the facts of the case).
3. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
4. For example, many judges have participated in judicial education programs that are
targeted to provide them with training in basic scientific methods so they can make admissibility
determinations in cases involving complex scientific theories with greater confidence. See, e.g.,
Tresa Baldas, Judges Going to School for Training in Science, NAT'L L.J., July 24, 2006, at 6
(discussing a new judicial scientific education program offered by the Advanced Science and
Technology Adjudication Resource Center in Washington).
5. For the purpose of narrowing the field, this Article focuses primarily on tort law cases
decided since 2000.
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applying the Daubert factors to the point of abdication of their
gatekeeper role. An example of this occurs when a court ignores a
relevant Daubert factor, such as when it admits an expert's theory that
has not been confirmed by an objective test, even when the expert could
have easily done so. Another example involves the misuse of
"differential diagnoses," a methodology of ruling out potential causes of
an injury until only the most probable cause remains. Some courts have
expanded this methodology beyond its reasonable degree of accuracy in
the medical context. Other courts have left sound science even further
behind by expanding "differential diagnoses" beyond the medical
context into fields where it simply does not fit.
Third, some courts, misinterpreting language in Daubert and its
progeny, limit Daubert gatekeeping to an expert's methodology and do
not apply it to his or her conclusions. They admit highly speculative
conclusions that are not supported by the expert's own methodology.
Fourth, courts differ on whether Daubert requires in limine pre-trial
hearings as contrasted with making routine evidentiary rulings in the
course of a trial. A closely related issue is whether a trial court has an
obligation to provide a full record, including written findings of fact and
conclusions of law, on its rulings on the admissibility or exclusion of
expert evidence, for the purpose of appeal.
The next part of the Article finds that appellate courts differ on the
applicable standard of review of a trial court's decisions to admit or not
admit expert evidence. Some courts apply an "abuse of discretion"
standard to the entire evidentiary ruling, while others apply a de novo
standard to the trial court's application of the Daubert framework. In
applying the abuse of discretion standard, some courts appear to take a
much closer review than others.
The Article then examines the status of Daubert's adoption in the
states and explores dramatic differences in its application. The Article
suggests that all state courts should adopt the federal gatekeeping
procedure to ensure accuracy of results and consistency of verdicts, and
also to eliminate incentives for major forum shopping between state and
federal courts.
Finally, the Article examines a recent initiative of the American
Law Institute ("ALI") that may unintentionally undermine Daubert
standards, and compromise the serious gatekeeping role of judges.
The Article concludes that Daubert is more important today than it
was twenty years ago at its inception. Judges of all philosophical views
should stand fast as gatekeepers when ruling on the admission of expert
evidence and protect against "junk science" in the courtroom.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

220

[Vol. 35:217

II. THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF DAUBERT AND ITS PROGENY
A.

Why Expert Testimony Requires Close JudicialScrutiny

Expert testimony, whether presented by plaintiffs or defendants,
can strongly influence juries. An expert witness has extraordinary
powers and privileges in court. Unlike lay witnesses, "an expert is
permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not
based on firsthand knowledge or observation." 6 Experts are unique in
that their testimony may be based on evidence that otherwise would not
be admissible.7 For example, experts can base their testimony on hearsay
to justify their opinions, even if such underlying evidence is
inadmissible. 8 Expert witnesses can testify on the ultimate issue in a
case, even though a lay witness would be prohibited from doing so. 9
The content of expert testimony is, by definition, outside the realm
of an ordinary juror's scope of knowledge.' 0 The basic calipers that
jurors use to evaluate testimony-their own life experience-are of little
value when jurors evaluate whether an expert is telling the truth. As the
Supreme Court recognized in Daubert: "'Expert evidence can be both
powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating
it.""' It often addresses an "unfamiliar and esoteric field."' 12 Moreover,
as one state high court recognized: "Evidence that purports to be based
on science beyond the common knowledge of the average person that
does not meet the judicial standard for scientific validity can mislead,
confuse, and mystify the jury."' 13 In addition to overwhelming or
misleading the jury, and regardless of whether such testimony is labeled
scientific or technical, "[t]here are a score of other concerns associated
with experts who lack a reliable basis for their opinion, ranging from
inadmissible to prolonging
their introducing evidence that is otherwise
14
litigation and wasting time and resources."'

6. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
7. See FED. R. EvID.703.
8. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593; see also Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21 F.3d
721, 728-29 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Sowards, 339 F.2d 401,402 (10th Cir. 1964).
9. See FED. R. EVID. 704(a).
10. See FED. R. EVID. 702.

11. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)).
12. Tabatchnick v. G. D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49, 55 (D.N.J. 1975).
13. State v. O'Key, 899 P.2d 663, 678 n.20 (Or. 1995).
14. David L. Faigman et al., How Good is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert
and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 648 (2000).
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From about 1923 until 1993, federal courts permitted parties to
present expert testimony involving novel scientific theories if the
underlying theory or basis of opinion was "generally accepted" as
reliable within the expert's particular field.' 5 The "general acceptance"
test, known as the "Frye standard," while on its face seemingly
restrictive, was liberally applied to favor admissibility of expert
testimony. More importantly, judges did not engage in a thorough
evaluation of the reliability of the proposed expert testimony. Simply
stated, the Frye test looked at whether novel scientific evidence was
6
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.' If it was, then
it could be admitted, so long as a proper foundation was shown and the
evidence had minimal relevance to the case; if it was not, then it was
inadmissible. 17 Courts generally took a "let the jury decide" approach,
allowing trials to become a battle of purported experts without regard to
the soundness of the evidence. Bad science presented as fact by shoddy
products from the market
experts resulted in the removal of beneficial
8
companies.'
many
for
ruin
economic
and
B. Rule 702, Daubert, and the Gatekeeping Role
In ruling that Congress's adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1975 supplanted the test for admissibility of expert testimony then in
effect in federal courts, the Supreme Court applied a major and helpful
requirement in Daubert: Expert testimony must be subject to a strong
and careful judicial gatekeeper function in order to protect a fundamental
tenant of justice-finding the truth.
The Supreme Court instructed that when "[f]aced with a proffer of
expert scientific testimony ...the trial judge must determine at the
outset... whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine
a fact in issue."' 19 First, Rule 702 requires that the district court evaluate
the qualifications of the witness to testify as an expert on the issue at
hand. 20 Then, the Court tasked district courts with screening proffered
15.
16.

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Id.

17.

See id.

18. See infra Part II.C.
19. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
20. Rule 702 requires a witness to establish his or her expertise by reference to "knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education." FED. R. EVID. 702. Even "[a] supremely qualified expert
cannot waltz into the courtroom and render opinions unless those opinions are based upon some
recognized scientific method .. " Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 759 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999).
See also Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Beelman River Terminals, Inc., 254 F.3d 706, 715 (8th
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expert testimony to ensure that what is admitted "is not only relevant,
but reliable.'
In determining reliability, the Court provided a
nonexclusive list of key factors for courts to consider before admitting
expert testimony, including (1) whether the theory or technique can be
and has been tested, (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication, (3) whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a
high "known or potential rate of error" and whether there are "standards
controlling the technique's operation", and (4) whether the theory or
technique enjoys general acceptance within the relevant scientific
community.22 It also required a determination as to whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and properly applied to the facts of the case.23
Two subsequent Supreme Court decisions, General Electric Co. v.
Joiner,24 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,5 further clarified that
Daubert requires a "fit" between the expert's reasoning and conclusions,
and applies to all technical or other specialized expert testimony, not just
scientific evidence. 26 Together, this trio of cases stands for the
fundamental principle that trial court judges must act as gatekeepers and
carefully screen expert testimony to ensure its reliability. The United
Cir. 2001) ("Though eminently qualified to testify as an expert hydrologist regarding matters of
flood risk management, [the witness] sorely lacked the education, employment, or other practical
personal experiences to testify as an expert specifically regarding safe warehousing practices."); cf
Hangarter v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1015 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Rule 702
'contemplates a broad conception of expert qualifications."') (emphasis omitted) (quoting Thomas
v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994)).
21. Daubert,509 U.S. at 589.
22. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-50 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 59294). The Rules Advisory Committee, in amending Rule 702 in 2000 to reflect Daubert, recognized
several additional factors that courts might consider. Some courts, such as the Third Circuit, have
taken this "Daubert-plusapproach," in which courts are encouraged to consider the factors included
in Daubert as well as additional factors, if applicable, in each case. See infra notes 151-52 and
accompanying text.
23. Daubert,509 U.S. at 592-93.
24. 522 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1997) (finding the trial court did not err in excluding plaintiff's
expert testimony when the expert concluded that plaintiff's cancer was caused by exposure to
polychlorinated biphenyls because the expert relied on tests performed on infant lab mice that
received massive, concentrated doses injected directly into their stomachs, and developed a different
type of cancer than the plaintiff, while no adult mice developed cancer after similar injections).
25. 526 U.S. 137, 154-55 (1999) (finding trial court did not err in excluding expert from
testifying when his opinion was based on visual and tactile examination of supposedly faulty tires,
others did not use this method in the industry, and the expert equivocated about the reliability of his
own testing method).
26. See also Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455-56 (2000) (holding that an appellate
court may direct entry of judgment as a matter of law when it determines that evidence was
erroneously admitted at trial and that the remaining properly admitted evidence is insufficient to
constitute a submissible case).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss1/8

6

Schwartz and Silverman: The Draining of Daubert and the Recidivism of Junk Science in Fed
2006]

THE DRAINING OFDAUBERT

223

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized Rule 702 as
"embod[ying] three distinct substantive restrictions on the admission of
27
expert testimony: qualification, reliability, and fit."
Initially, commentators primarily viewed Daubert as liberalizing
expert testimony standards by allowing trial courts to take a more
"flexible" approach to determining admissibility than the bright-line
general acceptance inquiry. 28 After all, courts were no longer constrained
to waiting for a theory to gain "general acceptance" in the field, but
could look to other factors. While such an interpretation of Daubert is
technically correct, it misses the more significant new gatekeeping role
that the Supreme Court mandated for trial court judges. In moving to a
factor-based approach, the Court provided appropriate flexibility to
allow courts to acknowledge new developments in science and
technology that may not be universally accepted, but have an objective,
proven, and sound foundation. To determine whether a theory that is not
generally accepted in the scientific community is sound is one reason
why the Court required district court judges to carefully and
independently screen expert testimony. The Supreme Court was
absolutely clear in Daubert that federal district court judges conduct a
preliminary assessment "to consider whether the testimony has been
subjected to the scientific method, ruling out any subjective belief or
unsupported speculation." 29 In sum, while Daubert does not require
courts to apply a test of "scientific certainty" to the admission of expert
evidence, it does require that such testimony rest upon "good grounds,

27. Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 741 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741-43 (3d Cir. 1994)). Effective December 1, 2000, the Federal Rules of
Evidence were amended to effectively codify this trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court cases. See Dhillon
v. Crown Controls Corp., 269 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that Rule 702 was amended in
2000 to "affirm[] the trial court's role as gatekeeper and provide[] some general standards that the
trial court must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of the proffered expert testimony")
(alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory committee's note (2000 amendments)).
28. See, e.g., Kaushal B. Majmudar, Note, Daubert v. Merrell Dow: A Flexible Approach to
the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 187, 188 (1993) ("This Note

will argue that while Daubert is not a revolutionary decision, it marks a shift towards more flexible
standards regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence."). See also Judith A. Hasko, Note,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Flexible Judicial Screening of Scientific Expert
Evidence Under FederalRule of Evidence 702, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 479, 479 (characterizing Daubert
as "liberal" and Frye as "rigid"); J.E. Cullens, Jr., A Review of Recent Daubert Decisions of
LouisianaState Courts, 52 LA. B.J. 352, 352 (2005) ("Although originally hailed as a triumph for
plaintiffs' attorneys attempting to use novel and untested scientific testimony to support their cases,
trial judges-especially those sitting in federal courthouses-have typically used Daubert and its
progeny to exclude rather than allow expert testimony at trial.").
29. Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Porter v. Whitehall
Labs. Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1993)).
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30

based on what is known."
The plaintiffs' lawyers who lost the Daubert case argued that the
judicial gatekeeper role is at odds with the jury system. It is not.
Gatekeeping respects the role of judge and jury. It keeps our justice
system functioning properly by shielding juries from misleading junk
science. As the Second Circuit has recognized, the close evaluation of
the fit between the scientific literature and the expert's testimony
required of district court judges by Daubert and its progeny do not
"impinge upon the jury's function. It is precisely such an undertaking
that assures that an expert, when formulating an opinion for use in the
courtroom, will employ the same level3 1of intellectual rigor as would be
expected in the scientific community.
C. The Public Policy Basis of Daubert
It is not a coincidence that Daubert coincided with the emergence
of toxic torts and the burgeoning use of experts in civil litigation.3 2 Bad
science presented as fact by experts can negatively impact the
availability of beneficial products and services. For example, in early
cases alleging that the morning sickness drug Bendectin caused birth
defects, courts generally allowed both sides to present their evidence and
let the jury decide the issue. 33 Despite overwhelming scientific evidence
finding no link between the drug and birth defects, several juries in the

30. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); see also Bonner v. ISP
Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[N]either Rule 702 nor Daubert requires than an
expert opinion resolve an ultimate issue of fact to a scientific absolute in order to be admissible.");
Jahn v. Equine Servs., PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 390 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that the district court "held
the experts up to entirely too strict a standard" when itexcluded their testimony because they could
not determine the cause of death with certainty, but could only offer the probable cause); RuizTroche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85-86 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that the
district court "set the bar too high" when it found that an expert's technique, though it survived the
rigors of testing, publication, peer review, and general acceptance within the scientific community,
was unreliable due to a lack of precision). Some commentators have suggested that judges have
occasionally "taken Daubert too far" by requiring a level of scientific certainty that is not attainable
or requiring a "piece-by-piece" assessment of evidence rather than a holistic evaluation of the
science. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Science Experiment, ABA J., Nov. 2005, at 10, 14 (quoting
Georgetown University Law Center Professor Paul Rothstein).
31. Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 269 (2d Cir. 2002).
32. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the
Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 31 (1993) (citing studies that found a 1500 percent rise in the
number of experts testifying in Cook County, Illinois between 1974 and 1989, and finding that
experts testified in 86 percent of all cases, 95 percent of personal injury cases and 100 percent of
product liability cases in a sample of California cases between 1985 and 1986).
33. See, e.g., Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Labs., 711 F.2d 1510, 1510 (11th Cir. 1983)
(upholding jury verdict).
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mid-1980s, adrift in a sea of conflicting "expert" testimony, rendered
multimillion-dollar awards after hearing expert evidence to the
35
contrary. 34 These verdicts were ultimately reversed on appeal, but not
before the manufacturer removed Bendectin from the market in 1983,
depriving women of the only Food and Drug Administration-approved
36
medication that blunted the hard symptoms of morning sickness. The
37
After Daubert, these
Daubert case itself involved this very topic.
38
Bendectin cases were thoroughly discredited
39
The Bendectin situation is not unique. Silicone breast implant
litigation forced Dow Coming to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1995.40
In those cases, some lower courts had abandoned their gatekeeping
function. When scientists carefully examined the issue and acted as
gatekeepers, no link was found between implants and autoimmune
4
disorders, cancer, or any other serious disease. ' Today, courts are

34. See, e.g., Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reversing a
$95 million verdict); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(affirming judgment for manufacturer notwithstanding a $1.16 million verdict). See generally
Sanders, supra note 32, at 4-12 (1993) (providing an overview of the Bendectin cases); Richard B.
Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual Track System, 88
GEO. L.J. 2167, 2171-72 (2000).
35. See, e.g., Ealy, 897 F.2d at 1160; see also Stewart, supra note 34, at 2171. Of the six cases
examined by Joseph Sanders, five of the manufacturers eventually prevailed. See Richardson, 857
F.2d at 823; In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 290 (6th Cir. 1988); Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1510;
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 706 (Tex. 1997); Hill v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., No. C83-74TB (W.D. Wash. 1988) (decided without opinion). The verdict that remained
intact and in favor of the plaintiffs was Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 506 A.2d 1100,
1113-15 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See Sanders, supra note 32, at 28-30 (recognizing that only one of six
cases survived appellate review completely).
36. See Barbara J. Culliton, Merrell Dow Stops Marketing Bendectin, 221 SCi. 37, 37 (1983).
37. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs
expert theory was based on animal and test tube studies. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 582-83 (1993). No study supported plaintiffs theory that Bendectin could cause
malformations in human fetuses. Id. For these reasons, the trial court concluded that this theory did
not meet the Frye general acceptance test. Plaintiffs appealed and the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial
court's ruling. The Supreme Court then set forth the Daubert factors and remanded the case for
proceedings consistent with them. Id. at 597.
38. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 708, 729 (extensively considering scientific methodology in a
Bendectin case to find that the offered epidemiological studies failed to show a sufficiently
increased risk and were not published or subject to peer review, and that offered animal studies did
not support causation in humans).
39. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 4 (1991)
(stating that "junk science is not an altogether new phenomenon in the courtroom").
40. James T. Rosenbaum, Lessons from Litigation over Silicone Breast Implants: A Callfor
Activism by Scientists, 276 Sci. 1524, 1524 (1997).
41. See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE
LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 109-10 (1996) (authored by the executive editor of the New
EnglandJournal of Medicine).
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applying Daubert to hold the line against unreliable testimony by experts
hired by plaintiffs' lawyers who have attempted to attribute autism in
children to thimerosal, a preservative used in life-saving vaccines, where
all available peer-reviewed and generally accepted epidemiological
studies contradict such a link.42 Fortunately, judges have acted as
gatekeepers and rejected such claims, preserving the availability of
vaccines.
Whether courts exclude unreliable expert testimony impacts the
outcome of such litigation as well as society as a whole.43 Where there is
no potentially broad harm to society, admitting unreliable expert
testimony can unjustly harm a defendant where its product or conduct
was not the cause of the plaintiffs injury. It undermines the ultimate
function of courts-to seek the truth. It unnecessarily raises the cost and
sometimes the availability of good products and services.

III.

THE SIGNIFICANT AND POSITIVE IMPACT OF DA UBERT
IN THE COURTS

Daubert and its progeny "changed [the] deference-to-the-field
approach... [and] brought [a] scientific culture to the courtroom. 4 4 For
example, in the first six years after Daubert, federal courts published
1065 opinions on expert admissibility, 871 of which involved civil
cases, or over 36 times the number of rulings in civil cases under the
Frye "general acceptance" test in the previous six-year period.45
A Federal Judicial Center survey of federal judges taken just prior
to Daubert and again five years after Daubert found that "j]udges were
more likely to scrutinize expert testimony before trial and less likely to
admit expert testimony" after Daubert.46 Judges became less willing to

42. See, e.g., Doe v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 465, 473-75 (M.D.N.C.
2006) (granting summary judgment for the manufacturer defendant in case seeking to link
thimerosal to autism where the plaintiffs expert's literature review did not meet the Daubert
standard's requirements that expert testimony be derived by scientific method and relevant, that the
expert doctor could not testify on general causation theory that autism could be caused by
thimerosal, and that the proffered expert testimony on issue of specific causation, based on
differential diagnosis, could not be admitted).
43. See Rosenbaum, supra note 40, at 1525 (discussing actions of some federal judges to
exclude expert testimony that was not scientifically sound in the Bendectin and silicone breast
implant litigation).
44. Faigman et al., supra note 14, at 655-56.
45. D. Michael Risinger, NavigatingExpert Reliability: Are CriminalStandards of Certainty
Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 104 (2000).
46. MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 1 (2000).
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invariably admit all proffered expert testimony. According to the
survey, 59% of federal judges admitted all proffered expert testimony in
their most recent civil trial. This amount was down from 75% in
response to the pre-Daubertsurvey question. 4 8 Generally, the testimony
was excluded because it was not relevant. 49 Post-Daubert, judges
became less likely to admit some types of expert testimony (65%) and
more likely to hold pretrial hearings regarding admissibility of expert
testimony (60%).50
A RAND Institute for Civil Justice study of federal district court
decisions between 1980 (thirteen years prior to Daubert)and 1999 (six
years after Daubert)produced similar results. 5' It found that "[s]tandards
for reliability tightened in the years after the Daubert decision" and "the
success rate for challenges rose." 52 The proportion of evidence found
unreliable after Daubert increased first in the physical or "hard"
sciences, but there were later rises for health care and medicine,
engineering and technology, social and behavioral sciences, and
business, law, and public administration.53 In one federal circuit, the
exclusion rate for evidence based on physical science in product liability
cases jumped from 53% during the two years before Daubert to 70%
two years following Daubert.4 Motions to dismiss on summary
judgment were granted in 21% of challenges during the four years
preceding Daubert compared to 48% in the two-year period beginning
two years after Daubert,with 90% of the rulings against plaintiffs.55 The
study concluded: "[F]ollowing Daubert, judges scrutinized reliability
more carefully and applied stricter standards in deciding whether to
admit expert evidence. After Daubert, the proportion of challenged

47. Id. at 4.
48. Id.
49. Judges most frequently excluded expert testimony because it was not relevant (47%), the
witness was not qualified (42%), the proffered expert testimony would not help the trier of fact
(40%), the facts or data upon which the expert testimony was based were not reliable (22%), the
prejudicial nature of the testimony outweighed its probative value (21%), or the principles and
methods underlying the expert's testimony were not reliable (18%). Id. at 5.
50. Id. at 4.
51. LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS
FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION 29
(2001), availableat http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1439/MR1439.pdf.

52. Id.
53. See id. at 33-35.
54. Id. at xvi.
55.

See id.at 57, 62.
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evidence in which reliability was discussed and the proportion of expert
evidence found unreliable rose. 56
Distinguished law professor David Owen has also recognized that
Daubert has successfully kept junk science out of federal product
liability cases, where expert testimony is particularly important: "PostDaubert, the federal district courts, exercising their newly appointed
'gatekeeper' function, have scrutinized expert testimony more closely,
often holding rigorous pre-trial 'Daubert hearings'-that are often
outcome determinative-to
determine the admissibility of proffered
57
expert testimony.
Dauberthas affected the admissibility of expert testimony in a wide
range of areas. For example, prior to Daubert, courts increasingly
allowed recovery for future lost profits based on expert testimony. A
typical pre-Daubert case is Perma Research & Development Co. v.
Singer, in which the Southern District of New York admitted a study
prepared by a licensor projecting future profits at the time of entrance
into a patent license contract.58 Courts also permitted businesspeople in
similar fields and certified public accountants to testify as experts in
respect to future profits. 59 Such damages were traditionally considered
too speculative to be recoverable. 60 Since Daubert, courts more often
exclude such testimony. For example, Parkway GarageInc. v. City of
Philadelphia, a case decided soon after Daubert, involved damages
where the city cancelled the lease of a parking garage. An expert was
permitted to testify about the financial records of a parking garage, but
any testimony about lost customers and their parking habits was
excluded as too speculative and without basis in the expert's field of
economics. 6 1 Similarly, Marcel v. Placid Oil Co.,62 Henry v. Hess Oil

Virgin Islands Corp.,63 and Elcock v. Kmart Corp.64 provide three
examples where courts adhering to Daubert principles excluded expert
testimony on lost earnings in tort cases. In each case, the courts found
56.
57.
58.
542 F.2d
59.
Harsha v.
60.

Id. at 61.
David G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80 DENVER UNIV. L. REV. 345, 362 (2002).
Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer, 402 F. Supp. 881, 899-901 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd,
III (2d Cir. 1976).
See, e.g., Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 552 F.2d 447, 454-55 (2d Cir. 1977);
State Sav. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 798-99 (Iowa 1984).
Harsha,346 N.W.2d at 797 (citing Shinrone, Inc. v. Tasco, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 280, 286

(Iowa 1979)).
61.
(E.D. Pa.
62.
63.
64.

Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, No. 90-7752, 1994 WL 412430, at *7-8
Aug. 3, 1994).
Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., I I F.3d 563, 567-68 (5th Cir. 1994).
Henry v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 246-48 (V.I. 1995).
Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 754-56 (3d Cir. 2000).
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that the experts' projections of future earnings failed to take into account
the specific circumstances of the plaintiff. While expert testimony on
future profits or earnings may sometimes be admitted under Daubert,
"the key difference is the need for the expert to use methods that have a
basis in her proffered field of expertise, 65 an increased emphasis that
the testimony "fit" the individual case, and the use of the scientific
method to evaluate such evidence.6 6
In addition, Daubert has affected the admissibility of the testimony
of economists on damages for lost enjoyment or value of life, sometimes
referred to as "hedonic damages. 67 Prior to Daubert, some courts
allowed such testimony with little or no review of the soundness of the
approach. 68 Today, courts are increasingly willing to exclude testimony
that applies statistics regarding the amount consumers are willing to pay
for safety devices, compensation levels in risky jobs, or the
government's willingness to impose safety regulations to suggest to a
jury an expert opinion on the monetary value a person would
purportedly pay to avoid death. 69 As one commentator recognized: "We
may be on the way to a kind of judicial notice of the unreliability of
[expert testimony on hedonic damages]. 7 ° One trial court judge ruled
that "any attempted Daubert/Kumho analysis of [such a theory] is
undertaken only at the risk of according it undue dignity.... Merely to
pose the question of whether [the proposed expert's] proffered approach

65. Shubha Ghosh, Fragmenting Knowledge, Misconstruing Rule 702: How Lower Courts
Have Resolved the Problem of Technical and Other Specialized Knowledge in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 43 (1999), http://jip.kentlaw.edu/art/
volume 1/1 -1- 1.htm.
66. Id. at 45, 46.
67. For a general discussion of hedonic damages and the admissibility of expert testimony
quantifying such damages, see generally Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages:
The Bubbling Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1037 (2004).
68. Ghosh, supra note 65, at 48-49. For example, in Sherrod v. Berry, a federal court
permitted such testimony. 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985). The court applied no particular
standard and did not even evaluate the "general acceptance" of the proposed theory, most likely
because the testimony was not scientific, but economic. With little analysis, the court found that the
expert's method of valuing life was not speculative, but was admissible because it was "relevant and
material and would aid the jury in determining the proper amount of damages in the event it found
in favor of the plaintiff." Id. at 162.
69. See, e.g., Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (allowing
testimony about hedonic damages, "excluding the quantification which has troubled both courts and
academics, but allowing an explanation adequate to insure the jury did not ignore a component of
damages allowable under state law").
70. G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its
Progeny,29 CREIGHTON L. REv 939, 1015 (1996).
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to hedonic damages demonstrates 'intellectual rigor' is to answer the
question.'
Post-Daubert,courts are also less likely to admit testimony simply
because the expert has testified before many other courts. For example, a
Louisiana appellate court reversed a trial court admitting expert
testimony because the trial court simply asserted that the expert had
"'been qualified by courts across the land,"' and thus the court did "'not
presume that all of them were incorrect.' 72 Instead, the appellate court
took a closer look at the witness's credentials and found he had no
engineering degree, no employees, no facilities or equipment, and he had
a poor educational background in engineering with employment
experience that had nothing to do with auto design.73
Law professor David E. Bernstein recognized a strengthening of
expert testimony standards in several areas soon after Daubert.7 4 For
instance, before Daubert, courts frequently admitted expert testimony
based on "post hoc clinical evidence," meaning that experts could testify
that a substance caused an injury simply because the plaintiff was
exposed to the substance just prior to the injury.75 An expert, for
example, might testify that an infant developed a brain tumor as a result
of a measles vaccination simply because the tumor developed soon after
the vaccination. This is an example of the post hoc ergo propter hoc
fallacy that is exposed as specious in first-year torts casebooks. 76 Since
Daubert,post hoc evidence is frequently excluded.7 7
Professor Bernstein also found that courts more often require
physicians testifying on the most likely cause of a patient's injury to
eliminate other possible causes of the condition. He further found that
courts more aggressively demanded that physicians consider the dosage
of a substance to which a patient was exposed when giving an opinion
on causation; and that courts require physicians to have expertise on the
subject in the case; they no longer permitted a doctor to testify on any

71.

Anderson v. Hale, No. CIV-02-0113-F, 2002 WL 32026151, at *7 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 4,

2002) (citation omitted).
72.

Mistich v. Volkswagen of Germany, Inc., 650 So. 2d. 385, 392 (La. Ct. App. 1995)

(quoting an unreported decision).
73. Id. at391-92.
74. David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientiftc Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2147 (1994).
75. Id.
76. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 267-68 (1 lth

ed. 2005) (examining Kramer Serv., Inc. v. Wilkins, 186 So. 625 (Miss. 1939)).
77. Bernstein, supra note 74, at 2149.
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medical issue. 78 Post-Daubertdecisions have more consistently excluded
physician testimony when offered outside his or her area of expertise.79
IV.

THE DRAINING OFDAUBERT

Although Daubert has generally strengthened standards for the
admissibility of expert testimony, some courts have deviated from the
words or spirit of the Supreme Court's decision. An analysis of
primarily federal appellate cases decided over the past five years reveals
at least five areas of inconsistency: relevance, flexibility of Daubert's
application, application (or lack thereof) of the expert's methodology,
the necessity of pre-trial Daubert hearings, and appellate standards of
review.
A.

Relevance, Reliability, and Analytical Gaps

The first of these areas of inconsistency involves a foundational
issue of the law of evidence-relevance. The Federal Rules were set up
to tilt toward admissibility of ordinary evidence. Federal Rules of
Evidence 401 and 402 allow for broad admissibility of evidence so long
as it is "relevant," meaning that it has "any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence., 80 As the Supreme Court has recognized,
"[t]he Rule's basic
81
standard of relevance thus is a liberal one."
When the admissibility of evidence offered by those presented as
experts is at issue, the Federal Rules and the Supreme Court have
recognized that additional safeguards are warranted and a higher level of
relevance is required. In Daubert, the Court observed that while Rules
401 and 402 provide the "baseline" for admissibility, when expert
testimony is offered, the more precise and rigorous requirements of

78. Id. at 2159-63. For example, in the pre-Daubert case Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., the
court found that a medical doctor who did not specialize in genetics, epidemiology, or teratology
was qualified to testify on whether spermicide caused a child's birth defects, though it ultimately
found the proffered evidence inadmissible. 770 F. Supp. 1561, 1567-68, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
79. See, e.g., Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 615 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Ralston
v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 969-70 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the testimony of a physician who specialized in
oncology where the issue-intramedullary nailings and whether manufacturer warnings were
adequate-was completely unrelated, and noting that "merely possessing a medical degree is not
sufficient to permit a physician to testify concerning any medical-related issue").
80.

FED. R. EVID. 401, 402.

81.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
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Rule 702 speak to the issue.8 2 In effect, Rule 702's requirement that
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge... assist the trier
issue 83
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
trumps the otherwise liberal relevancy requirements of the Federal
Rules. "Relevant," in the context of expert testimony, means a "valid
scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry, ' 8 4 a heightened level of
relevance characterized by the Court in Daubert as one of "fit.",85 The
Court further explained this "fit" requirement in Joiner:
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one
another. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But
nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a
district court to admit opinion evidence... connected to existing data
only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is
simply too86 great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered.
This is a higher standard of relevance than the "more or less probable"
approach of Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402 that govern
relevance generally. It provides that experts may not offer opinions that
do not "fit" the particular facts of the case. 87 The higher standard
recognizes that a district court has a special duty to examine proffered
expert testimony, testimony that by definition is outside the realm of an
ordinary juror's scope of knowledge, to ensure it is based on reliable,
scientific principles.8 8 In sum, the "sevens" are different than the
"fours." 89 Moreover, an expert's methodology must not only be reliable,
but when applied to the facts 90of a case, the conclusion should not require
"too great an analytical gap."

82. Id. at 587-88.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92.
85. Id. at 591 (adopting the standard applied by Judge Becker in United States v. Downing,
753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)).
86. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
87. In Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court emphasized that a court must focus on the
"reasonableness of using such an approach, along with [the expert's] particular method of analyzing
the data thereby obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert
testimony was directly relevant." Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 154 (1999).
88. In 2000, the Supreme Court again recognized that, "[s]ince Daubert,... parties relying on
expert evidence have had notice of the exacting standards of reliability such evidence must meet."
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
89. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (finding that, in cases involving expert testimony, Rule 702
"goes primarily to relevance").
83.
84.

90.

See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
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Despite the Supreme Court's instructions, some courts apply the
broad relevancy standard of Rule 401 to determine the admissibility of
expert testimony. For example, the Second Circuit has repeatedly looked
to Rule 401 to determine the relevancy of expert testimony and
disregarded the notion of "fit." 91 In a recent case, the Tenth Circuit
looked only to whether there was "a logical relationship between the
evidence proffered and the material issue that the evidence is supposed
to support, ' 92 rather than at the presence of the closer "fit" mandated by
the Supreme Court. The difference between the fours and the sevens is
significant because, under Rules 401 and 402, evidence need only pass a
bare "some relation to an issue" threshold, while under Rule 702, the
evidence must correspond to the facts of the case. These decisions have
drained Daubert of its fundamental purpose: to assist juries in evaluating
the credibility of reliable expert evidence.
Most federal courts have taken an approach that better protects
against unreliable expert testimony, requiring a higher standard
described as a "special relevance requirement" 93 or "higher than bare
relevance, 9 4 and have contrasted the "liberal admission of evidence"95
standard reflected in Rules 401 and 402 with Rule 702's "more stringent
standards of reliability and relevance." 96 They have found that "[e]ven a
theory that might meet certain Daubert factors, such as peer review and
publication, testing, known or potential error rate, and general

91. See, e.g., Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265-66 (2d Cir. 2002)
("In fulfilling this gatekeeping role, the trial court should look to the standards of Rule 401 in
analyzing whether proffered expert testimony is relevant, i.e., whether it 'has any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."') (citation omitted) (quoting Campbell v.
Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 239 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Rule 401's definition of
relevance and not discussing "fit")); Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 387 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding, without discussing "fit," that, so long as an expert's opinion is based on reliable
methodology, it should be admitted). In addition, the Fifth Circuit has occasionally gone down this
erroneous path. See Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 460 (5th Cir. 2002) (using Rule 401 to
define relevancy under Rule 702). But cf Bocanegra v. Vicmar Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d 581, 584 (5th
Cir. 2003) (articulating the heightened Rule 702 relevance requirement).
92. Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1234 (10th Cir. 2004) (admitting expert
testimony based on products that had a different design from the water heater at issue without
requiring the experts to account for those differences or to validate their theory).
93. Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998) ("To be
admissible, expert testimony must be relevant not only in the sense that all evidence must be
relevant, but also in the incremental sense that the expert's proposed opinion, if admitted, would
likely assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.") (citation omitted).
94. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994).
95. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11 th Cir. 1999).
96. Id.; see also McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1295 (1 lthCir. 2004).
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not be admitted if it does not apply to the specific
acceptance, should
97
facts of the case."
Experienced litigators, such as Richard 0. Faulk and Robert M.
Hoffman, have observed that the heightened relevance analysis is
becoming increasingly significant in some trial courts, and could
potentially eclipse the Daubert factors.98 They find that courts have
"insist[ed] that the reasoning process be explained to ensure that the
methodology and the facts and data upon which [they rely] are capable
of producing an ultimate opinion that is relevant to the case." 99 They
recognize that there are actually two types of "analytical gaps" that can
preclude admission of expert testimony.100 The first type of analytical
gap occurs when the data or assumptions relied upon by the expert do
not fit the actual facts of the case.101 This is primarily an issue of
relevance. The second type of analytical gap occurs when the expert
does not faithfully apply his or her methodology to the facts to reach the
ultimate conclusion. 102 This is primarily an issue of reliability, and goes
to the importance of a judge's examination of an expert's conclusions,
not just his or her methodology. Both a relevance fit and reliability fit
are important inquiries under Daubert.
1. The Relevance Fit-Making Certain Expert Theories Are
Consistent with the Facts of the Case and Theory of Liability
A number of courts, applying Rule 702, have properly precluded
experts from testifying when their theory might be of interest to a jury
(and admissible under the fours), but could be misleading and prejudicial
because it does not closely fit the facts. For example, a Rhode Island
97. Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1056, 1057 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding, in an antitrust case, that economist's testimony was properly excluded because his model
of the market did not reflect facts in evidence); see also Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d
244, 250 (6th Cir. 2001) ("This question of relevance, described as 'fit,' is not always obvious, and
scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated
purposes.") (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993)).
98. See Richard 0. Faulk & Robert M. Hoffman, Beyond Daubert and Robertson: Avoiding
and Exploiting "Analytical Gaps" in Expert Testimony, 33 ADVOC. 71, 71 (2005). They suggest

that this may be the case because trial court judges may find it less challenging to determine
whether an expert's observations and methodology fit the facts of the case and supports his or her
conclusions than attempting to apply each of the Daubert factors to different disciplines and factual
scenarios. See id.
99. Id. at 74.
100. See id at 74-75 (citing Kimberly S. Keller, Bridging the Analytical Gap: The Gammill
Alternative to Overcoming Robinson and Havner Challenges to Expert Testimony, 33 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 277, 312 (2002)).
101.

Id.

102.

Id.
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woman was injured when she was struck by her rolling car after parking
on a sloping driveway without setting the parking brake.' 0 3 She claimed
that her Mercedes was defective because it did not include a "park
ignition interlock," which would have prevented her from removing the
key from the ignition until she engaged the parking brake, 10 4 and sought
to introduce a mechanic to testify as an expert on product design. 10 5 In
addition to finding the proffered witness unqualified to testify on
automobile design, the appellate court found that the expert's "false park
detent theory" was unreliable, largely based on the lack of even an
attempt to apply the theory to the circumstances in the case. 0 6 As the
appellate court recognized:
[The proffered expert] examined the vehicle away from the site of the
accident. He did not, in any way, attempt to replicate the known facts
surrounding the injury-producing event, but rather, tested his theory by
raising a wheel of the vehicle as it sat in [an automobile repair shop].
On the record before us, it appears that [the proffered expert] did little
more than come to the unremarkable conclusion that the vehicle's
wheels would not turn when the gear selector level was in latched park,
but that they would turn when the lever was in any other position.IT
Kempner Mobile Electronics, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Mobile
Systems is another example of a case where an expert's testimony on
damages was at odds with the case's theory of liability.' 0 8 Kempner, a
cellular phone sales agent, sued its exclusive service provider, Cingular,
claiming that it would have entered an agreement to sell products for
Nextel, rather than Cingular, had it know of Cingular's alleged
misrepresentations. 0 9 After a jury finding of liability, however, the
expert sought to testify as to Kempner's damages based on simultaneous
sale of both Nextel and Cingular products." 0 Citing Rule 702, not Rule
401, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court properly

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 474-75 (1st Cir. 1997).
Id. at 475.
See id.
See id. at 479-80.
Id.at 479.
See Kempner Mobile Elecs., Inc., v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., 428 F.3d 706, 712 (7th Cir.

2005).
109. Id.
110. See id.
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excluded the evidence as "irrelevant and inapplicable to its theory of
liability.""'
McDowell v. Brown"1 2 shows how expert testimony can involve an
impermissible leap from the theory to the facts of the case. The plaintiff,
a prison inmate, complained to guards of back pain. They did not
transport him to an off-site medical treatment facility until several hours
later, and he then underwent surgery for an epidural abscess. Despite
surgery and treatment, he was rendered a paraplegic. The plaintiff sued
the facility, arguing that the delay in treatment caused his paralysis. He
attempted to bolster this theory with the testimony of two expert
witnesses, who cited a study analyzing treatment delays of forty-eight
hours, not the four hours the plaintiff waited. 13 For this reason, the trial
court found, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, that there was too large
an analytical gap between the study relied upon by the experts and the
conclusion they reached in the plaintiffs case. 14
There are many other examples of courts properly excluding
testimony where an expert's theory did not follow the facts in evidence
or the plaintiffs theory of liability." 5 Focusing on the specific rules of
evidence in the 701 series of cases is appropriate in terms of proper
statutory construction, as the specific trumps the general, sound public
policy, and the Supreme Court's ruling in Daubertitself.

111.

See id. at 713; see also Masters v. Hesston Corp., 291 F.3d 985, 991-93 (7th Cir. 2002)

(finding that the expert was well-qualified and his testimony in a product defect case was based on
accepted engineering principles, but was not properly applied to the particular design at issue).
112. 392 F.3d 1283 (1 lthCir. 2004).
113. Id.at 1299-1300.
114. Id. at 1299-1302.
115. See, e.g., J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 243 F.3d 441, 444-45 (8th Cir.
2001). In J.B. Hunt, the Eight Circuit ruled that the district court properly excluded the testimony of

an accident reconstructionist where his theory was based on three collisions with the plaintiffs car,
where eye-witness testimony established that the plaintiff's vehicle only twice collided with one of
the three vehicles involved. The circuit court also upheld the district court's decision to exclude the
testimony of a second purported expert, a "foamologist," which was built upon the three-car
collision theory proffered by the first expert. See also In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292
F.3d 1124, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing and remanding on grounds that the district court

failed to consider whether plaintiff's expert demonstrated that released radiation could cause the
plaintiffs ailment); Children's Broad. Corp. v. Walt Disney Corp., 245 F.3d 1008, 1018-19 (8th

Cir. 2001) (ruling that the district court acted within its discretion when it ordered a new trial
because, among other flaws, the plaintiff's expert testified on damages based on the original counts
in the complaint, while only three counts had survived summary judgment).
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The Reliability Fit-Requiring Conclusion to Flow from
Methodology
Perhaps misled by unclear language in Daubert, some courts have
declined to act as gatekeepers with respect to an expert's conclusions as
contrasted with his or her reasoning, methodology, or premises. The fact
that these courts have taken the wrong path may stem from a statement
in Daubert that: "The focus [of the admissibility inquiry], of course,
must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions
2.

that they generate."' 1 6 Some courts have interpreted this language to
mean that they must focus their reliability analysis exclusively on an
expert's methodology, 17 while permitting conclusions (which may lack
reliability) to dodge the gatekeeping function. Other courts have
properly recognized the potential for a "methodology-conclusion
gap,"' 118 and held that district court judges should examine an expert's
ultimate conclusion "to determine whether they could reliably follow
from the facts known to the expert and the methodology used."' "19
As discussed earlier, Joiner clarified that "conclusions and
methodology are not entirely distinct from one another."' 12 When
experts' conclusions do not follow from the science, data, or other facts
supporting their theories, there is "simply too great an analytical gap" to

116. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
117. See, e.g., TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 325 F.3d 234, 240 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that, "[i]n
applying Daubert, a court evaluates the methodology or reasoning that the preferred scientific or
technical expert uses to reach his conclusion; the court does not evaluate the conclusion itself," and
upholding admission of expert testimony to establish that Maryland liquor prices were higher than
the rest of the country even though the expert's analysis was limited on sales in metropolitan areas);
Smith v. BMW N. Am., Inc., 308 F.3d 913, 919 n.9 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Under Daubert,a court should
review only the methodology of the expert, not his or her conclusion."); Campbell v. Metro. Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 239 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that a district court must focus "solely
on... methodology, not on the conclusions they generate" in ruling that expert testimony was
admissible despite gaps or inconsistencies between the reasoning and conclusion) (quoting Daubert,
509 U.S. at 595).
118. See Faulk & Hoffman, supra note 98, at 75.
119. Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[T]rial
judges may evaluate the data offered to support an expert's bottom-line opinions to determine if that
data provides adequate support to mark the expert's testimony as reliable."); see also Nelson v.
Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 254 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that although there are
commonly observed symptoms of PCB exposure documented in scientific literature, an expert's
conclusion that PCB exposure caused the kinds of symptoms experienced by the plaintiffs in the
case at issue was not reliable); Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 279 (5th Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (noting that "[s]everal post-Daubert cases have cautioned about leaping from an accepted
scientific premise to an unsupported one," and finding no scientific support for the expert's
conclusion that exposure to any irritant at unknown levels triggers the asthmatic-type condition
experienced by the plaintiff).
120. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
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admit the testimony.' 2' The Court further instructed that "nothing in
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court
to admit opinion evidence
that is connected to existing data only by the
' 122
expert."
the
of
dixit
ipse
As a matter of basic logic in the search for the truth, Daubert
principles must be applied to both an expert's methodology and to his or
her conclusions. Experts, unlike lay witnesses, are permitted to reach
conclusions on the ultimate issue in the case. 23 For that very reason, it is
particularly important to ensure their conclusions flow from their
methodology before they are permitted to testify. To paraphrase Justice
24
Cardozo, conclusions in the air, so to speak, will not do.
As the Third Circuit recognized in Heller v. Shaw Industries,Inc.:
[T]he reliability analysis applies to all aspects of an expert's testimony:
the methodology, the facts underlying the expert's opinion, the link
between the facts and the conclusion, et alia.

[R]eliable methods for making a diagnosis cannot sanitize an
otherwise untrustworthy conclusion.

...

While the district court may not reject an expert's conclusion

simply because the court finds it wanting, it is surely within the court's
province to ensure that the conclusion, particularly a medical expert's
ultimate conclusion
on causation, "fits" with the data alleged to
12 5
support it.

When a court looks to the data underlying expert opinion but
neglects to evaluate its relation to the expert's conclusion, as the
Michigan Supreme Court has recognized, "ostensibly legitimate data
may serve as a Trojan horse that facilitates the surreptitious advance of
126
junk science and spurious, unreliable opinions."'
121.
122.

Id.
Id.

123. FED. R. EVID. 704(a) (stating that opinion testimony is not objectionable simply because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact).
124.

See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).

125. Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155-58 (3d Cir. 1999). The court repeatedly
emphasized that the experts' conclusions failed to flow from their data and methodologies. See id. at
158-61.
126.

Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 409 (Mich. 2004).
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A trial and retrial in Amorgianos v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp.12 illustrates the impact of a trial court's decision permitting an
expert to testify about conclusions that did not properly flow from his or
her methodology. In that case, the plaintiff claimed he inhaled toxic
fumes while painting a bridge, which lead to neurological and cognitive
conditions as well as various physical ailments. 28 The plaintiff called his
treating physician to testify that he suffered from a persistent nervous
system disorder that severely limited his strength, ability to walk, and
arm movement.1 29 The physician concluded that the fumes caused the
injury, largely based on the timing of his symptom's onset in relation to
the paint job. 130 The physician's diagnosis was directly refuted by a
video showing the plaintiff walking without apparent difficulty, a
medical report filed by the plaintiff after a car accident in which he
denied the types of physical problems alleged in the lawsuit, and an
3
independent medical examiner who found no abnormal condition. ' In
addition, the plaintiff complained of a lack of reflexes only in the left
typically manifested
side of his body, when the condition diagnosed
32
itself in bilateral, symmetrical symptoms.'
In the first trial, the court admitted the expert testimony and the jury
returned a $3.3 million award that included lost earnings, pain and
suffering, and loss of consortium. 133 Following the verdict, the district
court judge found that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
and ordered a new trial. 134 The case was reassigned to another district
court judge who granted the defendant's Daubert motion to exclude the
expert testimony as unreliable and ultimately granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment due to the lack of evidence of general
causation. 35 The district court found, and the Second Circuit affirmed,
that the studies cited by the physician had too great an analytical gap to
support her conclusion that the plaintiff's injury was caused from
exposure to the paint fumes for three reasons: (1) they did not consider
short-term effects of exposure; (2) they included individuals who were
exposed to substances other than those to which the plaintiff was
exposed; and (3) they all found symmetrical disabling effects, not an
127.

303 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002).

128.

Id. at 260.

129. Id. at262.
130. Id.
131. Id.at263.
132. Id.

133.

Id. at 260.

134.
135.

Id.
Id.
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effect on one side of the body as the plaintiff complained. 36 The
appellate court rejected the plaintiffs contention that the district court
judge "traded a judicial robe for a white lab coat,"'1 37 stating that "when
an expert opinion is based on data, a methodology, or studies that are
simply inadequate to support the conclusions reached, Daubert and Rule
702 mandate the exclusion of that unreliable opinion testimony.' ' 138 An
expert's analysis must be reliable "at every step,"
including reaching a
139
conclusion based on the facts and methodology.
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit permitted a Trojan horse to
slip through the gate in Bitler v. A.O. Smith Co. 140 In that case, the
question was whether a defect in a water heater's gas control mechanism
caused a house fire. 14 1 The plaintiffs' experts based their analysis on
research finding that large copper sulfide particles can cause leaks in
water heaters without a mesh inlet screen. 142 The experts based their
assessment on this data, but did not test their theory. 143 Nevertheless, the
experts presented to the jury the conclusion that tiny particles mixed
with grease could surpass the protective screen of the water heater at
issue and cause an intermittent gas leak.144 The defendants explained the
logic gap by way of analogy, stating: "Sommer's theory is akin to
concluding that because a large boulder, bounding down a hillside, may
be capable of crushing a passing car, a small pebble could do so as
145
well."
As these cases show, the gatekeeper role is compromised when
expert testimony is admitted because the methodology is apparently
sound, but the conclusion is detached from the facts of the case or the
expert's analysis.

136. Id. at 270. The court excluded the testimony of an industrial hygienist's conclusions due
to a similar lack of fit between the scientific literature and the facts of the case. Id.
137. Id.at 264.
138. Id.at 266.
139. See id at 267.
140. Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 395
(2005).
141. Seeid.at1231.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 1235.
144. Seeid. at 1231, 1238.
145. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, White-Rodgers v. Bitler, 126 S.Ct. 395 (2005) (No.
04-1485).
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B.

"Flexibility" Does Not Mean "Abdication"

Courts have occasionally misinterpreted the nature and extent of
their flexibility in applying the Daubert factors, sometimes to the point
of abdication. Those courts unduly emphasize language in the Supreme
Court's opinion, which characterized the inquiry as "flexible," stated
that the trial court "may" consider the provided factors, and clarified that
the factors were not intended as a "definitive checklist or test" for
146 These
determining whether a theory or technique is reliable.
qualifications, however, stemmed from the possibility that, in some
by
circumstances, applying one or more of the other factors discussed
case. 147
particular
a
in
applicable
or
feasible
be
not
might
the Court
As Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas,
cautioned at the time, "[T]he discretion it endorses-trial-court
discretion in choosing the manner of testing expert reliability-is not
discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function.' 148 In accord with this
philosophy, the Fifth Circuit has warned that "Kumho Tire's emphasis
on the word 'may' should not be misunderstood to grant open season on
the admission of expert testimony by permitting courts discretionarily to
disavow the Daubert factors."' 149 The Seventh Circuit has similarly
cautioned that while the Daubert factors are nonexclusive and flexible,
"[i]t is incumbent upon the trial court to carefully50 consider these factors
before admitting any expert scientific evidence."'
Some courts have gone further. They not only look to the four
factors articulated in Daubert, but also closely consider additional
factors. The Third Circuit, for example, has adopted this "Daubert-plus
approach." It encourages trial courts to consider the factors discussed in
Daubert as well as the method's nonjudicial uses and the relationship of
5
the technique to methods that have been established as reliable., 1 Some
146. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
147. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999) ("[Wlhether Daubert's
specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that
the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine.").
148. Id. at 158-59 (Scalia, J., concurring).
149. Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 1999).
150. Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Elsayed Mukhtar
v. Cal. State Univ., 299 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (vacating a district court's admission of
expert testimony when it found that the court "abdicated its gatekeeping role by failing to make any
determination that [the expert's] testimony was reliable").
151. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 742 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding
relevant factors to include "(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; (2) whether the
method has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence
and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; (5) whether the method is
generally accepted; (6) the relationship of the technique to methods which have been established to
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appellate courts have found it particularly appropriate for a district court
determining reliability to consider whether the expert's opinions were
formed for the purpose of testifying and funded by the attorneys
litigating the case or whether they were developed naturally outside the
52
context of litigation. 1
Nevertheless, other courts continue to admit expert testimony
without engaging in an adequate Daubertanalysis of its reliability.153 By
overemphasizing the "flexible" approach language, they may admit
expert testimony after closely relying on a single factor or permit
admission even when one applicable factor, i.e., testing, is clearly not
met. These courts, in a sense, view Daubert as liberalizing the
admissibility of expert testimony (beyond general acceptance under
Frye) to provide additional options to find that evidence is admissible
without undertaking the corresponding thorough review of its reliability.
1. Testing a Readily Testable Theory
An example of such abrogation occurs when a court ignores a
relevant Daubert factor, such as when it admits an expert's theory that is
readily testable even though the expert did not attempt to prove its
accuracy. Expert testimony must be "ground[ed] in the methods and
procedures of science" to satisfy the standard of evidentiary
reliability.154 Daubert recognized that, first and foremost, what
distinguishes theory or technique from admissible expert testimony is
whether it can be and has been tested. 55 The Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of testing as a "key" to determining admissibility of
expert testimony.156 Courts generally recognize the testing factor as
' 57
"Daubert'smost significant guidepost."'
be reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the methodology; and (8)
the non-judicial uses to which the method has been put"); see also Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 421

F.3d 528, 534-35 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting six additional factors discussed by the 2000 Advisory
Committee's Notes to Rule 702).
152. Clausen v. MV New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Nelson v. Tenn. Gas
Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 252 (6th Cir. 2001).

153.

See infra notes 285-90 and accompanying text.

154.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).

155. See id.
at 593. It may surprise some to learn that an originator of the scientific method was
not a scientist, but none other than a lawyer. In 1620, Sir Francis Bacon, a barrister who rose to be
Lord Chancellor of England under the reign of James I, published his seminal work, Novum
Organum. Bacon believed that "investigating and discovering truth" about nature requires a
repeating cycle of observation, hypothesis, experimental tests, and the need for independent
verification. FRANCIS BACON, NovuM ORGANUM (1620), reprinted in ADVANCEMENT
LEARNING AND NOVUM ORGANUM 316-17, 332 (rev. ed., Willey Book Co. 1944) (1900).

OF

156. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 ("'Scientific methodology today is based on generating
hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what
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Testing is not only important with respect to scientific evidence, it
is important with respect to technical or other specialized knowledge as
well. In Kumho Tire, the Court found that Rule 702 made "no relevant
distinction between 'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other
specialized' knowledge" and found that the district court's gatekeeping
158 As one of the
obligation applied equally to all expert testimony.
nation's leading authorities on scientific evidentiary issues, Professor
Margaret Berger has recognized: "Although Rule 702 specifies that an
expert may be qualified through experience, the Court's emphasis in
Daubert on 'testability' suggested that an expert should not be allowed
to base a conclusion solely on experience if the conclusion can be easily
tested."15 9

An expert's hypothesis, without testing, is rendered unsupported
speculation. As a well-respected scientific research text states:
The most important feature of a hypothesis is that it is a mere trial idea,
a tentative suggestion concerning the nature of things. Until it has been
tested, it should not be confused with a law. Unfortunately, in many
fields, especially on the borderlines of science, hypotheses are often
for
accepted without adequate tests. Plausibility is not a substitute
16
to believe. 0
wish
emotional
the
be
may
great
however
evidence,

In effect, without testing, the expert has thrown his or her hands in
the air and exclaimed, "Gotcha!" after developing a reasonable theory to
explain an event, but before verifying it. This is a common mistake that
can protect against by exercising their
diligent federal judges
1 61
gatekeeping function.'
distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry."') (emphasis added) (quoting Michael D.
Green, Legal Theory: Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation:
The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992)); see
also Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) ("[T]he party
seeking to have the district court admit expert testimony must demonstrate that the expert's findings
and conclusions are based on the scientific method, and, therefore, are reliable. This requires some
objective, independent validation of the expert's methodology."); State v. O'Key, 899 P.2d 663, 672
(Or. 1995) (en banc) ("The scientific method is a validation technique, consisting of the formulation
of hypotheses, followed by observation or experimentation to test the hypotheses.").
157. Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2002).
158. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
159. Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court's Trilogy on Admissibility of Expert Testimony,
in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 15 (2d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL].
160. E. BRIGHT WILSON, JR., AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 26 (1952).

161. As college students are instructed in introductory level courses: "The most fundamental
error is to mistake the hypothesis for an explanation of a phenomenon, without performing
experimental tests. Sometimes 'common sense' and 'logic' tempt us into believing that no test is
needed. There are numerous examples of this, dating from the Greek philosophers to the present
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As gatekeepers, judges have an obligation to keep theories out of
the courtroom unless and until the expert's hypothesis is tested. Reliable
expert testimony should not require a leap of faith. For instance, when a
light bulb will not turn on, there are at least three likely potential causes:
the bulb could be burned out, the bulb could be loose in the socket, or
the circuit breaker could have triggered. Rather than postulate on the
most likely cause of the problem based on a cursory visual examination,
statistics on bulb lifetimes, and potential electrical current problems, an
"expert" ought to shake the bulb, attempt to tighten it, and reset the
circuit breaker.
As the authors of the treatise Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law
and Science of Expert Testimony have observed: "[M]any courts are
willing to reject testimony when it is clear that the expert could create
better evidence.... Simply put, courts are beginning to wonder, if these
162
theories and opinions are testable, why haven't they been tested?"'
Testing is particularly important in product liability cases in which
the relative safety of an alternative design is at issue. As the Seventh
Circuit, which considers testing "crucial" in such cases, has explained:
In alternative design cases, we have consistently recognized the
importance of testing the alternative design. In deciding whether an
alternative design is appropriate, an expert needs to look at a number
of considerations: "the degree to which the alternative design is
compatible with existing systems ... ; the relative efficiency of the two
designs; the short- and long-term maintenance costs associated with
the alternative design; the ability of the purchaser to service and to
maintain the alternative designs; the relative cost of installing two
designs; and the effect, if any, that the alternative design would have
on the price of the machine." Many of these considerations are
product- and manufacturer-specific and cannot be reliably determined
without testing. 163
For that reason, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court
properly excluded the testimony of two expert witnesses who would
have testified that the plaintiff would not have been injured if the forklift
164
in which he was riding included a rear door rather than an open back.

day." Frank Wolfs, Laboratory Experiments 1996-1997, Appendix E: Introduction to the Scientific
Method, http://teacher.nsrl.rochester.edu/phy labs/AppendixE/AppendixE.html (last visited Nov.
12, 2006).
162. Faigman et al., supranote 14, at 666.
163. Dhillon v. Crown Controls Corp., 269 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted)
(quoting Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1996)).
164. Id. at 869-71.
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The experts had not performed any tests of their hypothetical models to
determine whether the alternative design would be economically feasible
1 65
and would actually be as safe as, or safer than, the doorless model.
The court noted that, in some situations, evidence suggested that the
presence of a rear door could exacerbate the injuries
of the operator by
66
not allowing a quick escape from a tipping vehicle.1
Another example is Zaremba v. General Motors Corp., which
involved the collision of a Pontiac Trans Am, driven by a drunk driver
speeding at nearly one hundred miles per hour, into a curb at a fork in
the road. 167 The crash killed the driver and severely injured the backseat8
passenger, while the front seat passenger survived with minor injuries.16
The passengers were not wearing seatbelts. The plaintiffs sued the
manufacturer claiming that the vehicle's "T-top" design was defective.
Plaintiffs sought to call two expert witnesses: an engineer to testify on a
safer alternative design and a medical doctor to testify that the plaintiffs'
injuries would not have been so severe had the manufacturer adopted the
alternative design.' 69 The district court found that the engineer's
testimony was inadmissible because, among other reasons, he had not
examined or tested the Trans Am, had not created a drawing or
prototype of his alternative design, and had not tested his alternative
design. 70 Without the testimony of the engineer, the district court found,
the doctor was "on even shakier ground" in testifying as to how the
plaintiffs might have fared in the theoretical car.' 71 The Second Circuit
agreed, finding that "[n]umerous courts have excluded expert testimony

165.

Id. at869-70.

166. Id. at 871. In another forklift accident case one year earlier, the question was whether the
vehicle's design should have included wire mesh guarding in the front of the operator's
compartment to protect the occupant from harm. See Bourelle v. Crown Equip. Corp., 220 F.3d 532,

535 (7th Cir. 2000). In that case, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court's decision to exclude
expert testimony where the expert had not tested the proposed design or made any attempt to show
its economic feasibility. Id. at 536-39. The Eighth Circuit has also excluded expert testimony in

forklift product liability cases where the expert had never designed a forklift or similar machine;
never tested his proposed protective device; and never examined another vehicle with such a design,
as well as where the expert had never designed the recommended safety device. See Anderson v.
Raymond Corp., 340 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2003); Dancy v. Hyster Co., 127 F.3d 649, 652 (8th

Cir. 1997).
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

360 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 356.
Id. at 357.
Id.
Id. (quoting the unreported district court decision).
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the expert failed to create
regarding a safer alternative design where
' 72
tests.'
administer
or
models
or
drawings
The lack of testing can exclude a defendant's expert witness just as
well as expert testimony offered in support of a plaintiff. For instance, in
Black v. M & W Gear Co., the plaintiff claimed that her husband would
have survived the rollover of his riding lawnmower if it had included a
four-post rollover mechanism. 73 The defendant offered an expert
witness to testify that a rollover system would not have resulted in a
different outcome. The trial court excluded defendant's expert from
testifying because he had not conducted any tests supporting his
conclusion. Additionally, his testimony revealed that he was mistaken
74
about the type of rollover bar that was central to the plaintiffs claim.'
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that the trial court appropriately
concluded that75the defendant's expert testimony was "without any basis
whatsoever."
The testing method itself must be reliable. Courts should reject
"haphazard" tests conducted solely for the purpose of litigation. 76 For
example, in a recent product liability case, the plaintiff claimed that a
defect in a machine used to cut flooring failed to properly shut off,
resulting in an injury to his leg. 177 The plaintiffs expert witness
conducted and videotaped two tests spanning about twenty minutes in
support of the plaintiffs allegations. 7 8 The first test involved observing
the machine when strapped between two desk chairs in the plaintiffs
counsel's conference room. 179 The second test involved observing the

172. Id. at 358-59 (citing Bourelle v. Crown Equip. Corp., 220 F.3d 532, 536-38 (7th Cir.
2000); Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 992 (5th Cir. 1997); Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus.,
Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1996); Brooks v. Outbound Marine Corp., 234 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir.
2000)). The "testing" factor of Daubert may not always require experts to develop a prototype of
the proposed alternative design in order for their opinions to be admitted. See, e.g., Unrein v.
Timesavers, Inc., 394 F.3d 1008, 1012 (8th Cir. 2005). When such testing is not practically or
economically feasible, an expert must, at a minimum, prepare drawings or models of the purported
safer design or show how the proposed safety-enhancing component could be incorporated into the
existing design and demonstrate how the proposed device would function. See id. (holding that
district court properly excluded expert testimony of mechanical engineering professor on proposed
incorporation of safety trip cord or braking device into industrial sander where expert did not show
how such devices would be incorporated into the machine and work to protect the operator).
173. 269 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001).
174. Id. at 1236-37.
175. Id. at 1237.
176. See Pullins v. Stihl Inc., No. 03-5343, 2006 WL 1390586, at *3, *5 (E.D. Pa. May 19,
2006).
177. Id. at *1.
178. Seeid. at*3.
179. Id.
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machine when placed on a cord in the expert's driveway.' 80 The expert
could not remember what model machine the plaintiff used or explain
various aspects of his own testing methods.' 18 The district court ruled
that the methods the expert used to reach his conclusions "can only be
described as exactly the kind of 'junk science' that Daubert sought to
purge from the federal courts."'' 82 The court, acting as a gatekeeper,
excluded the expert's testimony as well as that of a second expert who
primarily based his conclusions on the same unreliable tests. 183
Not all courts place an appropriate emphasis on testing. For
example, in a case against Maytag alleging that a defect in a kitchen
range caused a man's electrocution, the district court admitted the
testimony of an expert who represented to the court that he was
"currently designing a testing procedure which when completed will
conclusively prove [his] theory to be true.', 184 In reversing the judgment
in that case, the Seventh Circuit wisely emphasized that "the absence of
any testing indicates that [the expert's] proffered opinions cannot fairly
be characterized as scientific knowledge" and amount to "nothing more
than unverified statements unsupported by scientific methodology.' 8 5
Another example of a district court admitting expert testimony
without testing, only to be reversed by the circuit court, is Weisgram v.
Marley Co. 186 In Weisgram, the plaintiff alleged that a defect in a
baseboard heater caused a fire that destroyed a home and killed one of
its occupants. The Eighth Circuit found that the district court committed
prejudicial error in admitting the testimony of three expert witnesses: a
fire captain, a master electrician, and a metallurgist.' 87 While the Eighth
Circuit's decided that the fire captain's theory as to how the fire spread
88
was based on unsupported speculation that went beyond his expertise,'
its decision with regard to the other two witnesses was based in large

180. Id.
181. ld.at *3 & n.3.
182. Id. at *3.
183. See id.
at *4-5.
184. Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 2002).
185. Id. at 688. See infra note 290 for further discussion of this case. See also Clark v. Takata
Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 757-59 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding, in a case involving whether a lap belt,
fastened properly, would have protected a passenger from spinal injury resulting from a rollover,
that the district court properly excluded the plaintiff's expert's opinion where he did no testing
based on the passenger's height or weight, the force of impact, or the strength or flexion of the
particular lap belt to support his "bottom line" conclusion that the passenger would not have
suffered serious injury).
186. 169 F.3d 514 (8th Cir. 1999).
187. Seeid. at520-21.
188. Id.at 518-19.
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part on the experts' failures to test their theories. For example, the
appellate court found that the master electrician "did no testing to bolster
this ... theory of fire cause and origin."'' 89 The court found that the
absence of such testing rendered his testimony "rank speculation" and
"nothing more than pure conjecture" as to whether the manufacturer's
baseboard heater was defective and caused a fire.' 90 Likewise, the
metallurgist testified that the heater failed to shut off, but he "performed
no tests to determine whether it was even theoretically possible that the
contacts could get sufficiently hot to weld [leading the heater to not shut
down] during the operation of the heater" and also performed no tests to
determine why the backup system did not sense the temperature and shut
the heater down.'91
Some courts have strayed from the sound basics of the Daubert
decision and admitted expert testimony based on cursory visual
inspections when testing or other "better evidence" could verify or
support their theory. 192 For example, the Tenth Circuit, when faced with
a case with facts similar to Weisgram, did not require the experts to test
their theory. Bitler v. A.0. Smith Corp. involved plaintiffs who were
injured by a gas explosion in their home. 193 Investigators discovered two
potential causes for the explosion: a leaking "T-connector" on the
bedroom heater, and a leaking gas control valve on the water heater,
manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiffs maintained that the water
heater leak caused the explosion. Their theory was that copper sulfide
particles became lodged in the water heater's safety valve, preventing an
adequate seal, and allowing the gas to leak. 194 Plaintiffs' experts
"observed the physical evidence at the scene and deduced the likely
cause of the explosion,"' 195 but did not conduct any objective testing to
confirm their theory. The defendants challenged that theory, pointing out
that no particles large enough to obstruct the valve were found at the
site. Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Daubert's
189.

Id. at 519-20.

190.

Id. at 520.

191.

Id. at 521. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, after finding that the expert testimony was

improperly admitted and there was insufficient evidence to show causation, that the Eighth Circuit
was within its discretion to direct judgment for the defendant, rather than remand for a new trial. See
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 456 (2000).
192. See, e.g., Correa v. Cruisers, 298 F.3d 13, 26 (1st Cir. 2002) (permitting a mechanic to
testify that a boat had a bad fuel system when he conducted only a cursory visual inspection that
revealed a "fouled up" spark plug and excessive smoke, but did not use any instruments or gauges).
193.

400 F.3d 1227, 1227 (10th Cir. 2005). See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text for

more discussion of this case.
194.

Id. at 1231.

195.

Id.at 1235.
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"testing" requirement and found that plaintiffs' experts were not
required196to test their theory because the science involved was not
"novel"'
or otherwise disputed. 197 Curiously, the same court that had
198
indicated that testing was essential in Black v. M & W Gear Co.,
concluded in Bitler that Daubert does not require scientific testing in
every case to establish reliability. 99 It found that the district court acted
within its discretion when it permitted the expert testimony without
requiring objective testing.200 The Bitler decision is a particularly
egregious example of the draining of Daubert, as the expert could have
easily and inexpensively tested his theory. One could reasonably
conclude that the expert's failure to conduct such a test was predicated
on his belief that a test would not support his conclusion.
2.

A "Differential Diagnosis" Should Not Mean Guesswork and
is Not a Substitute for Sound Science
Another example of the draining of Daubert occurs with respect to
the admissibility of "differential diagnoses." Physicians traditionally use
this process to determine "which of two or more diseases with similar
symptoms and signs the patient is suffering from, by means of
comparing the various competing diagnostic hypotheses with the clinical
findings." 20' Environmental and occupational health physicians,
however, occasionally use the term "differential diagnosis" to include
the process of determining whether an environmental or occupational
exposure caused the patient's disease.20 2 It is this latter definition
focusing on external causation that is often used in litigation. For
example, the Fourth Circuit has explained differential diagnosis as a
process used by doctors to diagnose a patient by listing several possible
causes of the patient's symptoms, then, through the process of
elimination, striking unlikely causes until isolating the most probable

196. Id. at 1235-36.
197. Id. The court distinguished these facts from those in another Tenth Circuit Case, Truck
Insurance Exchange v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2004), where the plaintiff offered
an unproven theory that wood could ignite at lower temperatures than science had previously
acknowledged. Biler,400 F.3d at 1235-36 (citing Truck Ins. Exch., 360 F.3d at 1211-13).
198. See supranotes 173-75 and accompanying text.
199. Bitler, 400 F.3d at 1236.
200. Id.
201. Mary Sue Henifin et al., Reference Guide on Medical Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL,
supra note 159, at 481 (emphasis added); see also id. at 443.
202. Id.at 443; see also Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1208 (8th Cir. 2000)
(distinguishing between the traditional use of differential diagnosis to determine the patient's
condition from its use in litigation to determine the cause of that condition).
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one. ° 3 A number of courts have accepted the use of differential
diagnoses in order to determine causation in the medical context. 4
There are indications that its use is expanding into other areas as well.
a.

Differential Diagnosis in the Medical Context

Unless courts properly fulfill their gatekeeper role, expert witnesses
can cross what is sometimes a fine line between differential diagnosis
and pure guesswork. 0 5 In such an analysis, courts must ensure that an
expert's initial decision to "rule in" a particular source as a potential
cause of the plaintiffs injury has a sound scientific basis. 20 6 For
instance, in ruling in potential causes for the purpose of a differential
diagnosis, it is improper to include alternatives that contradict
established epidemiological studies. Those studies are properly
understood by both scientists and judges as the "best evidence of general
causation., 20 7 The court must then review the expert's reasoning to
203. Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1999).
204. See, e.g., Clausen v. MN New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing
differences in usage of the term "differential diagnosis" to identify a patient's disease or the cause
of that disease, and finding that "[d]ifferential diagnosis is a common scientific technique, and
federal courts, generally speaking, have recognized that a properly conducted differential diagnosis
is admissible under Daubert"); Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1211-12 (10th
Cir. 2002) (stating that differential diagnosis is admissible in some cases, so long as it is reliable);
Glastetter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that a differential
diagnosis is "presumptively admissible," and citing Turner, 229 F.3d at 1208 (recognizing that
"[m]ost circuits have held that a reliable differential diagnosis satisfies Daubert and provides a valid
foundation for admitting an expert opinion," but excluding such testimony where the differential
diagnosis identified the plaintiff's condition, not the cause of that condition)); In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 758 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[D]ifferential diagnosis generally is a technique that
has widespread acceptance in the medical community, has been subject to peer review, and does not
frequently lead to incorrect results ....).
205. There may be cases where district courts have been too harsh in their assessment of
differential diagnosis techniques, considering them guesswork even when supported by scientific
evidence. For example, in Baker v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 156 F.3d 248 (1st Cir. 1998), the
district court did not permit the defendant's experts to testify that the product user's chlamydia
provided an alternative cause of the her pelvic inflammatory disease ("PID") although scientific
studies supported chlamydia as one of the most common causes for the plaintiffs type of PID. See
id at 252. The district court based its decision in part on the prejudicial effect of introducing "sexual
innuendo" into the trial and in part on the court's skepticism of differential diagnosis. See id at 251.
The First Circuit reversed and found that the district court had improperly precluded the Dalkon
at 253.
Shield Claimants Trust from offering a valid defense. See id.
206. See, e.g., McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding that expert inappropriately "ruled in" the herbal weight-loss supplement Metabolife as the
cause of plaintiffs' ailments, despite the lack of scientific evidence establishing such a connection).
207. See Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882, 885-86 (10th Cir. 2005)
(finding that district court properly excluded expert who would testify that silicone breast implants
are responsible for systemic autoimmune disease when such testimony was "flatly contradictory" to
all epidemiological studies on the issue); see also Raynor v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371,
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ensure that he or she has good grounds for ruling out each cause as less
probable than the remaining causes. Finally, the court should require the
expert to adequately address and rule out other plausible alternative
causes raised by the opposing party or, at least, offer an explanation as to
why he or she has concluded that they were not the sole cause.20 8 Some
courts have admitted differential diagnoses that do not meet these
standards. Many of these cases overemphasize temporal relationships,
rather than focusing on causation established through the scientific
method. 20 9 These courts have fallen for one of the oldest myths, the post
hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. 2 10 This fallacy says that because one event
follows another, the second event was therefore caused by the first
event. 2 11 Reduced to its basic form, it can be used to prove that washing
one's car can cause it to rain.
Moreover, it is inappropriate to permit a treating physician who was
primarily concerned with establishing his patient's condition to utilize an
21 2
incomplete differential diagnosis to speculate about its causation.
Such expert testimony has the propensity to mislead the jury because a
physician may be well within his expertise to diagnose a patient's
condition, but may not have a sound basis for giving an opinion about
how a plaintiff contracted the disease. Differential diagnoses of this type
are likely to come "more as an afterthought, in an ad hoc manner" and
may fail13 to systematically consider and rule out alternative potential
causes.

2

There are many examples of trial courts properly serving as
gatekeepers to distinguish between a differential diagnosis based on
sound science and guesswork in the medical context. For example, in a
case involving whether use of the diabetes medication Rezulin led to the
plaintiffs liver failure, the trial court found, and the Second Circuit

1374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (providing that expert theories drawn from in vitro and animal studies had
been disproven by established epidemiology); Meister v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 267 F.3d 1123, 112732 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (excluding plaintiffs expert testimony that implants caused plaintiffs
scleroderma when experts failed to show that her ailment can be caused by silicone implants).
208. See Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 1999).
209. See McClain, 401 F.3d at 1243 (reversing a trial court admission of expert testimony
where the experts' conclusion that the herbal weight-loss supplement Metabolife caused the
plaintiffs' health problems was supported only by the temporal relationship between the two, and
warning that "[d]rawing such a conclusion from temporal relationships leads to the blunder of the
post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy," which "literally means 'after this, because of this."' (citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1186 (7th ed. 1999))).
210. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supranote 76, at 268.
211. See id

212. See Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1208 (8th Cir. 2000).
213.

See id
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affirmed, that the expert failed to offer any medical studies or other
evidence tying the drug to the plaintiffs condition.2 14 In another case,
the Second Circuit found that the trial court properly excluded an
expert's concededly "controversial" theory that the plaintiffs exposure
to fuels containing benzene and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
("PAHs") while working on a ship caused his cancer because it was not
"grounded in reliable scientific methods, as required by Daubert."2 15 The
district court ruled that the expert "was ready to form a conclusion first,
without any basis, and then try to justify it [later]. 2 16 Moreover, the
expert failed to rule out the seaman's heavy drinking and smoking over
two decades as probable alternative causes, both of which studies
established as major risk factors for cancer.2 17 Likewise, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed a trial court's exclusion of expert testimony seeking to
draw a link between Parlodel, a medication taken to suppress postpartum
lactation, and stroke. 2 18 The expert relied primarily on case reports,
which the court viewed as "simply a doctor's account of a particular
patient's reaction to a drug or other stimulus,

'219

noting that such reports

do not consider alternative causes of the condition,220 contain little
analysis, often omit relevant facts, and show little more than a temporal
association which does not substitute for scientifically valid proof of
causation. 22 1 Most recently, a district court found "irregularities" in an
214. See Ruggiero v. Warner-Lambert Co., 424 F.3d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Where an
expert employs differential diagnosis to 'rule out other potential causes' for the injury at issue, he
must also 'rule in the suspected cause' and do so using 'scientifically valid methodology."')
(quoting Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 771 (E.D. Va. 1995), affid on this ground, rev'd
on other grounds, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996)).
215. Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 37-38, 50 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 355 (2005).
216. Id.at38.
217. Id. at 50.
218. See Glastetter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 988-92 (8th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam).
219. Id.at 989.
220. For example, the Eighth Circuit noted that the plaintiff had occasionally suffered from
migraines prior to the stroke, was overweight, and smoked heavily for several years. See id.
at 987.
221. See id.at 989-90. The court also recognized the "critical" difference between a regulation
and litigation. See id. at 991. In response to the plaintiffs argument that the FDA's revocation of
Parlodel's indication for suppressing lactation, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the FDA decision
was based on a balancing of the drug's limited beneficial use against the possible harm to women
already susceptible to disease. "The methodology employed by a government agency 'results from
the preventative perspective that the agencies adopt in order to reduce public exposure to harmful
substances,"' which requires a lesser showing of harm that the preponderance of evidence standard
used to assess tort liability. Id. (quoting Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 95 F. Supp.1230, 1234
n.9 (W.D. Okla. 2000)). Thus, the Eighth Circuit found that an FDA decision to rescind a drug
application is unreliable proof of medical causation. Id. For additional decisions recognizing the
difference between preventative government agency standards and actions and reliable evidence of
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expert's differential diagnosis associating thimerosal, a preservative
included in RhoGAM (a drug given to pregnant women that significantly
decreases the risk of Hemolytic Disease of the Newborn as well as
222 In addition to
childhood vaccines) with the development of autism.
various other problems with the expert's qualifications and
methodology, his differential diagnosis failed to consider and rule out a
potential genetic cause of the condition.223
In some cases, appellate courts have had to intervene to keep out
questionable differential diagnoses. For example, one plaintiff claimed
that her slip and fall on a film of mayonnaise resulted in fibromyalgia
syndrome, a condition characterized by complaints of generalized pain,
chronic fatigue, and poor sleep, most common in women between the
2 24
ages of thirty and fifty, and often associated with hormonal problems.
A magistrate permitted the expert to testify to drawing such a
conclusion, despite a lack of underlying medical support. 225 The Fifth
Circuit explained its reversal:
This analysis amounts to saying that because [the expert] thought she
had eliminated other possible causes of fibromyalgia, even though she
does not know the real "cause," it had to be the fall at Food Lion. This
is not an exercise in scientific logic but in the fallacy of post-hoc
propter-hoc reasoning, which is as unacceptable in science as in law.
By the same "logic," [the expert] could have concluded that if [the
in a ride,
plaintiff] had gone on a trip to Disney World and been jostled 226
fibromyalgia.
of
onset
the
to
contributed
have
could
that event
Two Fourth Circuit cases show the roulette wheel that can
characterize decisions admitting and excluding differential diagnoses. In
Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, the plaintiff claimed that his

inhalation of talc in the workplace led to his sinus problems. 227 The
employer contended that the plaintiffs expert could cite no
causation for the purpose of tort liability, see National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk
Producers, Inc., 191 F.3d 858, 860-61 (8th Cir. 1999); Mitchell v. Gencorp. Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 783
n.3 (10th Cir. 1999); Siharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 131 F. SupP.2d 1347, 1366 (N.D. Ga.
2001), aff'd, sub nom. Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11 th Cir. 2002).
222. See Doe v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 465, 477 (M.D.N.C. 2006).
223. Seeid. 477-78.
224. Black v. Food Lion, Inc, 171 F.3d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1999).
225.

Id. at 313-14.

226. Id. Four years after the Fifth Circuit considered whether there was sufficient medical
evidence to permit an expert to testify that trauma causes fibromyalgia syndrome and found that,
although medical science had advanced in treating fibromyalgia, it had not sufficiently progressed
on causation of the condition since its opinion in Black to permit admission. See Vargas v. Lee, 317
F.3d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 2003).
227.

Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1999).
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epidemiological studies, peer-reviewed published studies, animal
studies, or laboratory data supporting such a link.22 8 Instead, the
defendant claimed that the expert relied on a flawed differential
diagnosis, in that he could not "rule in" talc as a possible cause of the
disease and his assessment was largely based on the temporal
relationship between the exposure and onset of the disease. 229 The
Fourth Circuit, however, upheld admission of the testimony-which
allowed the jury to infer that the plaintiff s level of exposure to talc was
substantial enough to cause the irritation--despite a lack of
measurement of the level of the plaintiffs actual exposure. 230 While the
court recognized that "the mere fact that two events correspond in time
does not mean that the two necessarily are related in any causative
fashion," it found that a temporal relationship "can provide compelling
evidence of causation" when there is additional evidence of causation,
such as an established scientific connection between the exposure and
illness, or improvement of the condition when the exposure is removed
but a worsening when it returns. 23' Finally, the court found that the
expert had sufficiently considered and ruled out alternative causes
suggested by the defendant, such as water skiing and a cold in close
temporal proximity to onset of the illness.23 2

228. Id.at 262.
229. See id. at 262-63.
230. Id. at 264.
231. See id. at 264-65. This ruling can be compared to Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc., 151
F.3d 269, 277-79 (5th Cir. 1998), in which the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's exclusion of
expert testimony that the plaintiffs brief inhalation of chemicals during cleanup of a spill resulted in
an asthmatic-type condition, reactive airways dysfunctional syndrome ("RADS"). The court found
that the expert's conclusion was largely based on the temporal relationship between exposure and
onset, but the expert failed to consider the level and duration of exposure, and there was no
scientific evidence to support the theory that exposure to the chemical at issue could cause RADS at
a nominal level. See id. "In absence of an established scientific connection between exposure and
illness, or compelling circumstances .... the temporal connection between exposure to chemicals
and an onset of symptoms, standing along, is entitled to little weight in determining causation." Id.
at 278. The court also noted that the expert failed to rule out other more probable causes of onset,
such as the plaintiff's twenty years of moderate to heavy smoking, recent recovery from pneumonia
before contact with the chemicals, or suffering from a similar asthmatic condition in his youth. See
id. at 279.
232. Wesiberry, 178 F.3d at 365-66. See also Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 246-50
(5th Cir. 2002) (reversing exclusion of expert's testimony that plaintiff's salmonella infection was
caused by contaminated syringe where product included chicken parts and expert had ruled out
alternative causes, although medical literature did not support connection or find similar cases, and
other syringes in production lot were not contaminated); Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 243
F.3d 255, 261, 265, 267 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing exclusion of expert testimony that railroad
conductor and brakeman's Carpal Tunnel Syndrome was a result of workplace activities based on
differential diagnosis where plaintiffs "work did not involve typical monotonous repetitive hand
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Two years later, the Fourth Circuit applied the principles expressed
in Westberry to exclude, rather than admit, expert testimony. In Cooper
v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., a plaintiff offered an expert to testify as to his
"unconventional views" regarding the safety and efficacy of the use of
pedicle screws in spinal surgery.233 The case involved a system for

stabilizing the spine by fusing two or more vertebrae together endorsed
as safe by the Food and Drug Administration, although not explicitly
approved for that purpose.234 This system was used unsuccessfully on
the plaintiff, who continued his twenty-five year, pack-a-day cigarette
habit despite the warnings of his physicians as to the harmful effect of
smoking on the potential for success of the surgery.235 Even though this
non-union was a well-known risk of spinal fusion, the expert sought to
testify that the broken screw caused the non-union, not that the nonunion caused the screw to break.236 The expert's testimony was based on
his differential diagnosis.2 3 7 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's exclusion of the expert testimony on the basis that he failed to
consider and rule out smoking, which was established in the medical
to non-unions, as well as other potential causes of
literature as leading
238
the non-union.
b.

Expanded Acceptance of Differential Diagnosis "Beyond
the Medical Context"

While a sound differential diagnosis may be "generally accepted"
in the medical context, a recent opinion allowed its use in a completely
different field. In a case we have referred to where the Tenth Circuit
refused to require an expert to test his theory, although it would be easy
to do so, the court also permitted the plaintiffs' experts to use the process
of elimination to reach a conclusion that debris lodged in the valve of a
water heater caused a gas leak.239 Specifically, plaintiffs' experts worked
"backwards to the cause of a single explosion" by "eliminating possible

activities which have been the subject of study" in the scientific literature, after expert ruled out
plaintiffs' outside-of-work activities as potential causes).
233. See Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 201 (4th Cir. 2001).
234. Id. at 197.
235. Id. at 197-98.
236. Id. at 201.
237. Id. at 200.
238. Id. at 202-03. The court also excluded the expert's testimony because he had failed to
conduct a physical examination of the plaintiff, a practice that was not consistent with the expert's
own diagnostic standards in his medical practice. See id. at 203.
239. See Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1237-38 (10th Cir. 2005).
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causes as improbable until the most likely one [was] identified., 240 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that: "[I]n this circumstance [differential
diagnosis] is a valid scientific technique to establish causation," 24 1 but
acknowledged that it was "not so clear" whether it is otherwise
acceptable outside the medical context. 242 In sum, the Bitler court took a
theory that has often been misapplied in the medical context and
misapplied it in a new and totally different area of expert knowledge.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Bitler may provide ammunition for
those who would like to abandon sound science and expand use of the
process of elimination into other areas. In fact, The FederalLitigator, a
West newsletter tracking civil procedure and evidentiary decisions,
referred to Bitler in its "Litigation Tips" section, stating: "There is no
reason why differential diagnosis-based expert testimony should not be
similarly admissible as evidence of causation in the nonmedical
context. ' ,243 A recent law review article has also highlighted the use of a
differential diagnosis to determine the cause of a propane gas explosion,
noting that a differential diagnosis "is not limited to medical
diagnosis. 244 Therefore, although the Tenth Circuit in Bitler at least
qualified its holding to the facts before the court, it may have
opened the
245
door for differential diagnoses beyond the medical context.
3. Undue Reliance on One Factor While Ignoring Others
In Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, where the Supreme Court
expanded Daubert's principles based on science to almost all areas of
expert evidence, Justices Scalia, O'Connor and Thomas filed a separate
concurring opinion to make an additional important point. 246 First, they
240. Id.at 1237.
241. Id.at 1236.
242. Id.at 1237. In Stibbs v. Mapco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D. Iowa 1996), the court also
admitted a differential diagnosis offered for the purpose of establishing the fact that there had been a
propane explosion, and the circumstances surrounding the explosion. id. at 1225-26. The court,
however, found that the differential diagnosis was problematic as to the cause of the explosion
because the expert's conclusions were not supported by the facts. Id. at 1223-25.
243. Don Zupanec, Expert Testimony-Differential Diagnosis-NonmedicalContext F.R.E.

702, 20 FED. LITIG. 14, Feb. 2005, at 45.
244. Donald Patterson, The When, If and How of Challenging Expert Testimony in Federal
Court,29 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 167, 192 (2005).
245. See Non-Medical Experts May Use "Differential Analysis" to Find Causation, 2
ANDREWS EXPERT & SC. EVID. LITIG. REP. 7, Dec. 2004 (discussing Bider as authority for non-

medical experts to use differential analysis). But see Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, No. 041039, 2006 LEXIS 555, at *28 (Tex. June 16, 2006) (rejecting the use of a differential diagnosis
when "the universe of possible causes for the tire failure is simply too large and too uncertain to
allow an expert to prove a manufacturing defect merely by the process of elimination").
246. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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reiterated their agreement with the majority that Daubert does not permit
discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function.24 7 Then, the concurring
trio went one step further and concluded that Daubert is not discretion to
"function inadequately. 248 They explained that "in a particular case the
failure to apply one or another of [the Daubert factors] may be
unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion. 249
Despite this guidance, some courts have unduly relied on a single
Daubert factor while ignoring others, or placed excessive emphasis on
an expert's credentials. For example, in a case in which a worker
claimed that glue fumes in the workplace caused her throat polyps, the
Second Circuit upheld a district court decision admitting the testimony
of a consulting engineer and a physician based largely on their
experience and credentials, despite their inability to pinpoint scientific
support for such a link.25° Instead, the court found that "[d]isputes as to
the strength of [an expert's] credentials, faults in his use of differential
etiology as a methodology, or lack of textual authority for his opinion,
251 the classic
go to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony,,
leave-it-to-the-jury approach. Such a statement shows a fundamental
misconception and abdication of the gatekeeper role. Credentials do not
rule. Sounds science does, and it is the trial judge's duty to act as a
gatekeeper in evaluating whether the expert relied on reliable evidence.
The Ninth Circuit has diminished the importance of Daubert by
when
requiring only "some kind of reliability determination"
22522 It found
considering non-scientific or non-technical expert testimony.
that the trial court met that standard when it considered only the
"knowledge and experience" of the plaintiffs expert insurance
adjustor. 2" 3 The court stopped short of categorically holding that
Daubert only applies in scientific and technical cases, but nonetheless
drained its meaning by permitting the trial court to apply only a few
factors.254

247. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 159 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1040-44 (2d Cir. 1995).
251. Id.at 1044.
252. See Hangarter v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004).
This test originates from an earlier Ninth Circuit case, Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., 299
F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2002).
253. Hangarter, 373 F.3d at I018.
254. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

41

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35:217

A Ninth Circuit case that turned on whether a piece of imported
fabric was hand- or power-loomed provides a final example. 255 Proper

designation was important to the plaintiff, an importer, because powerloomed products are subject to a quota and a higher import duty rate and
require a visa for entry. 256 The district court relied solely on customs
standards distinguishing hand- from power-woven fabric, without
determining their reliability.25 7 The Federal Circuit reversed and
remanded, finding that the trial court over-relied on the "generally
accepted" customs standards, particularly since the importer-plaintiff
raised legitimate concerns about their reliability.258 If the district court
had been faithful to Daubert, it would have required testing or other
Daubert factors to establish a "more persuasive showing of
reliability. 259
C. Requiring "Daubert Hearings" and a Complete Record
Prior to Daubert, judges ordinarily made decisions on the
admissibility of expert testimony during trial, in front of a jury, upon the
objection of counsel. Since that time, most federal courts encourage
litigants to request a pre-trial hearing on the admissibility of proposed
expert testimony. Federal courts, however, appear to differ on the value
they place on Dauberthearings. A related issue is whether district courts
have an obligation to provide a full record, including written findings of
fact and conclusions of law, on their rulings on the admissibility or
exclusion of expert evidence for the purpose of appeal. These logical
requirements do not necessarily favor either plaintiffs or defendants. As
the cases below demonstrate, in some instances, courts have admitted or
excluded expert testimony for either side without a formal Daubert
hearing or a sufficient record.
1. Daubert Hearings are a Necessary Aspect of the Gatekeeping
Role
Pre-trial Daubert hearings provide an opportunity for a judge to
closely review the relevance and reliability of the proposed expert
testimony, as well as the expert's credentials, and to make an informed
decision as to its admissibility. The Daubert hearing alerts the trial judge

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1365-68.
Id.at 1368-69.
See id. at 1369.
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to potential disputes concerning experts and requires the court to
recognize its obligations under Daubert to closely examine both whether
the proposed expert is qualified in the area in which he or she will testify
and the relevance and reliability of the proposed expert's methodology
and conclusions in advance of trial. Whether an expert should be
permitted to testify is both a complex and vital issue. It is easily outcome
determinative, but not so easily decided in the midst of an actual trial.
Scheduling the Daubert hearing at the outset of litigation reduces
the risk of evidentiary ambush arising from the late disclosure or
nondisclosure of experts. It also provides litigants with a preview of the
strength of their opponents' cases, which may encourage settlement or
support a motion to dismiss a weak case on summary judgment.
Despite the benefits of providing a pre-trial hearing, some appellate
courts have sent mixed messages as to if and when such a hearing is
required. Most courts find that if there is an extensive evidentiary record,
a district court may opt to make a preliminary determination to admit or
exclude expert testimony without a formal hearing. 260 Nevertheless, it is
clear from the language of many of these decisions that appellate courts
view Daubert hearings as a near-essential component to an admissibility
determination and they strongly encourage, if not require, such hearings.
For example, the Eighth Circuit, while not necessarily requiring a
pre-trial hearing, 26' has suggested that challenges to admissibility of
expert testimony should be raised prior to trial, and "ideally," a Daubert
hearing, if conducted, should occur well before the expert is scheduled
to testify. 262 The Ninth Circuit has found that a district court "did not

necessarily abuse its discretion" in refusing to hold a Daubert hearing,
but it "encourage[d] the court to hold a [Daubert] hearing on remand to

260. See, e.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1138-39 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding that a district court is not required to hold a Daubert hearing so long as it has an
adequate record before it, such as expert reports, deposition testimony, and affidavits); Nelson v.
Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 249, 253-54 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding a district court's
decision to exclude the plaintiffs' expert testimony without holding a Daubert hearing in PCB
exposure case where the parties had fully briefed the issue, there was an "extensive record," and the
proposed experts failed to determine the actual level of the plaintiffs' exposure to PCBs, "utterly

ignored" numerous other possible causes for their claimed injuries, and found no support for their
theory of causation in the scientific literature); Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 153-55 (3d
Cir. 2000) (finding that the district court acted within its discretion in excluding a plaintiffs expert
witness from testifying on the crashworthiness of a truck despite its failure to hold a Daubert

hearing where there was an extensive evidentiary record including a preliminary report, an amended
report, an affidavit, and two depositions, and the plaintiff could not explain how he was prejudiced
by the lack of a hearing).
261. See, e.g., Anderson v. Raymond Corp., 340 F.3d 520, 523-24 (8th Cir. 2003).
262. See In re Air Crash at Little Rock Ark., 291 F.3d 503, 514 (8th Cir. 2002).
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provide plaintiffs with an opportunity to respond to the defendants'
challenges, including an opportunity to question defendants' expert
opinions, submitted in support of their Daubert motions. 263 Likewise,
the Eleventh Circuit has recognized Daubert hearings as particularly
' ' 264
"helpful in 'complicated cases involving multiple expert witnesses.
In some instances, courts have properly found that failure to hold a
Daubert hearing is reversible error. For example, the Third Circuit held
that a district court erred by refusing the defendant's repeated request for
a Daubert hearing concerning the admissibility of the testimony of the
plaintiffs economic loss expert.265 The Third Circuit found that the
proposed expert had not fully explained his methodology and it was not
possible for the opposing party to effectively analyze the expert's
methods in the midst of a trial.266 A Daubert hearing "would have
permitted a fuller assessment of [the expert's] analytical processes and
thus was a necessary predicate for a proper determination as to the
reliability of [the expert's] methods. 267
Other courts have dismissed the need for a Daubert hearing. In
several cases, the Sixth Circuit has found that a district court is not
required to hold a Daubert hearing and provide formal findings. 268 For
example, in a case involving a rollover accident of a sports utility
vehicle, the defendant, Ford Motor Company, requested a pre-trial
hearing on the admissibility of the testimony of the plaintiffs' accident
263. In re HanfordNuclear,292 F.3d at 1138-39 (emphasis added) (upholding exclusion of the
testimony of an expert on behalf of thousands of plaintiffs who claimed that exposure to emissions
from a nearby nuclear facility caused them various illnesses). Cf Hangartar v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1018 (9th Cir 2004) (finding that the court's "probing" of the
proposed experts' "knowledge and experience" sufficiently satisfied Daubert's gatekeeping
function, and that separate, pre-trial reliability hearings were not required, stating that "[n]owhere in
Daubert... does the Supreme Court mandate the form that the inquiry into relevance and reliability
must take") (quoting United States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000)).
264. United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1234 (11th Cir 2001) (quoting City of
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 564-65 n.21 (1 th Cir. 1998)); see also Cook v.
Sheriff of Monroe County, 402 F.3d 1092, 1114 (11 th Cir. 2005) (finding no abuse of discretion
when the judge did not hold a preliminary hearing to determine admissibility of plaintiff's lone
expert witness, and stating that "because this is not a 'complicated case involving multiple expert
witnesses' we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by not holding a Daubert
hearing").
265. Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 744-45 (3d Cir. 2000).
266. See id. at 747.
267. Id. at 745 (citation omitted).
268. See Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 249 (6th Cir. 2001); Clay v. Ford
Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 667 (6th Cir. 2000); Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir.
1999) (holding, in a case where the expert's testimony conflicted with eye witness accounts, that
"the trial court is not required to hold an actual hearing to comply with Daubert, [but] is required to
make an initial assessment of the relevance and reliability of the expert testimony").
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reconstruction expert. 269 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, even though it

recognized that the district court judge never ruled on Ford's motion for
a preliminary hearing, requiring Ford to raise continuing objections at
trial.270 Although the Sixth Circuit characterized whether the district
court abused its discretion as "a close case," it concluded there was no
error, as it found the expert's testimony "was relevant to the issues in
this case., 27 1 The court's brief analysis, which, like the district court's,
did not explicitly examine the testimony's satisfaction of any of the
Daubert factors, 272 demonstrates the potential adverse result when there
is no Daubert hearing and an apparently incomplete record.273
2.

Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Are
Essential to Appellate Review
Although appellate courts do not ordinarily reverse district courts
for failure to hold Daubert hearings, they are more likely to do so when
a district court does not provide written findings of fact and conclusions
of law supporting its ruling on admissibility. Creation of a sufficiently
developed record is an "absolute necessity" to appellate review. 274 As

269. Clay, 215 F.3d at 666.
270. See id. at 666-67. The district court judge denied Ford's request for a hearing because the
company waited to file it until one week before trial with "no good cause" shown for the delay. Id.
The court determined the motion could have been made much sooner because it "was predicated on
a ruling made almost three months earlier." Id. at 666.
271. Id. at666-67.
272. See id. at 668-69.
273. The Sixth Circuit has also found that Daubert hearings are unnecessary where reliability
is "taken for granted," where the expert's methods "are relatively uncontroversial" and not
"original," and particularly when the expert provides a technical, experience-based assessment. See
Bureau v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 129 F. App'x 972, 975-77 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding no error
where the district court summarily denied a Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of the
defendant's roofing expert who sought to testify that a poor roof and inadequate ventilation caused
chronic moisture in the attic, based solely on a visual inspection of the roof, when the expert did not
use any sophisticated equipment that would mislead the jury or lead the jury to give his testimony
great weight, and finding that peer review or empirical analysis was unnecessary for this type of
technical, experience-based assessment).
274. Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. (Goebel 1), 215 F.3d 1083, 1088 (10th Cir.
2000). The only exception to this requirement may be when there is no objection raised to the
proffered expert testimony. See, e.g., Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 4-5 (lst Cir. 1995) ("We think
Daubert does instruct district courts to conduct a preliminary assessment of the reliability of expert
testimony, even in the absence of an objection. We do not think, however, that district courts are
required, sua sponte, to make explicit on-the-record rulings regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony."); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 938-39 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting a sua sponte
obligation to make a finding on admissibility with respect to all expert testimony).
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the Seventh Circuit has recognized: "[T]he gatekeeper must do more
than just make conclusory statements. 2 75
For example, the Tenth Circuit has properly instructed that a trial
court "must adequately demonstrate by specific findings on the record
that it has performed its duty as a gatekeeper," because "[w]ithout
specific findings or discussion on the record, it is impossible on appeal
to determine whether the district court 'carefully and meticulously
review[ed] the proffered scientific evidence' or simply made an off-thecuff decision to admit [or exclude] the expert testimony. 2 76 For
purposes of appellate review, "a natural requirement of this function is
the creation of 'a sufficiently developed record in order to allow a
determination of whether the district court properly applied the relevant
law.",, 277 Indeed, without sufficient findings an appellate court is wholly
unable to analyze what occurred below. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has
found that "[a] district court should not make a Daubert ruling
prematurely, but should only do so when the record is complete enough
to measure the proffered testimony against the proper standards of
reliability and relevance., 278 In that case, the court was unable to
determine whether the district court erred in excluding two veterinarians
from testifying on the cause of a champion pony's death after surgery
because the record lacked veterinary studies that verified or contradicted
the experts' contentions.2 79
These decisions show that regardless of whether a district court
conducts a formal Daubert hearing, it must create a record when it
makes decisions about the admissibility of expert testimony so that the
decision is subject to effective appellate review.
D. Appellate Review: Trial Court Discretion "Is Not Discretion to
Abandon the Gatekeeping Function"
Appellate courts vary both on the applicable standard of review and
how they apply it. Some courts apply an "abuse of discretion" standard
275.

Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 421 F.3d 528, 535 (7th Cir. 2005). See infra notes 287-90 and

accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
276. Goebel 1, 215 F.3d at 1088 (first alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Call, 129
F.3d 1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997)). On remand, the district court found in favor of the plaintiff, and
on appeal the Tenth Circuit affirmed. See Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. (Goebel I1),
346 F.3d 987, 989, 1001 (10th Cir. 2003). Goebel II did not disturb Goebel l's holding requiring
specific findings and discussion on the record. See id. at 990.
277. Goebel 1, 215 F.3d at 1088 (quoting United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1262 (10th
Cir. 1999)); United States v. Lee, 25 F.3d 997, 999 (11 th Cir. 1994) (encouraging specific findings).
278. Jahn v. Equine Servs., PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2000).
279. See id.
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to the entire evidentiary ruling, while others apply a de novo standard to
the trial court's application of the Daubert-Rule 702 framework-a
question of law-and an abuse of discretion standard to the application
of that framework to a particular expert-a question of fact. Moreover,
in applying the abuse of discretion standard, some courts appear to take
a much closer review than others.
1. The Standard of Review
The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits consistently
apply an abuse of discretion standard to both the trial judge's
determination of how to test an expert's reliability, as well as its
application of that standard to the facts of the case. 280 Some of their
decisions rely on Joiner, in which the Supreme Court reversed the
Eleventh Circuit's application of "a particularly stringent standard of
review, '281 in favor of an abuse of discretion standard.282 Other courts
rely on language in Kumho Tire in which the Supreme Court stated that
the district court's discretion "applies as much to the trial court's
decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate
conclusion. 2 83 In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia clarified this
point:
[T]rial-court discretion in choosing the manner of testing expert
reliability [is] not discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function. I
think it worth adding that it is not discretion to perform the function
inadequately. Rather, it is discretion to choose among reasonable
284
means of excluding expertise that isfausse and science that is junky.
Some circuits have adopted a two-step standard of review. They
first apply de novo or "plenary" review to determine whether the trial
court applied the proper legal standards for reviewing expert testimony.
The appellate court then evaluates the trial court's determination of
280. See, e.g., Unrein v. Timesavers, Inc., 394 F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing
Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 292, 296 (8th Cir. 1996)); Hangarter v. Provident Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1015 (9th Cir. 2004); Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2002); Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 200 (4th
Cir. 2001); Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1999).
281. See, e.g., Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Joiner
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 136 (1997)).
282. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ("[W]e hold, therefore, that abuse of
discretion is the proper standard by which to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude
scientific evidence.").
283. See, e.g., Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 265 (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Inc. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 152 (1999)); see also Cooper, 259 F.3d at 200 (same); Black, 171 F.3d at 310 (same).
284. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158-59 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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whether specific proffered expert testimony is admissible based on an
abuse of discretion review. The Tenth Circuit describes the two-step
review process as follows:
[W]e review de novo the question of whether the district court
performed its gatekeeper role and applied the proper legal standard in
admitting an expert's testimony. We then review for abuse of
standard
discretion the trial court's actual application of the gatekeeper 285
in deciding whether to admit or exclude an expert's testimony.
This means that an appellate court first takes a fresh look at whether
the trial court properly applied the Daubert framework in evaluating the
proposed expert testimony, such as whether the testimony qualified as
scientific or technical evidence, whether it merely focused on the
expert's professional qualifications rather than the methodology used or
conclusions reached, whether it conducted an adequate pre-trial hearing
or other preliminary assessment, and whether it engaged in the type of
thorough, independent review mandated by the Supreme Court. The
appellate court would then review whether the trial court properly
applied the Daubert factors to admit or exclude the specific expert
evidence at issue under an abuse of discretion standard. The Third,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits286consistently apply this dual standard of
review to evidentiary rulings.
For example, in Fuesting v. Zimmer, the Seventh Circuit applied de
novo review to find that the district court did not complete an adequate
Daubert analysis of expert testimony admitted in a product liability
287
claim involving the sterilization technique used on a prosthetic knee.
285. Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. (Goebel 11), 346 F.3d 987, 989-90 (10th Cir.
2003) (citation omitted). See also Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 883 (10th Cir.
2005) (reaffirming the de novo standard); Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 421 F.3d 528, 534 (7th Cir.
2005) ("We first undertake a de novo review of whether the district court properly followed the
framework set forth in Daubert. Provided the district court adhered to Daubert's parameters, we
will not disturb the district court's findings unless they are manifestly erroneous." (citations
omitted) (quoting Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1994))).
286. See, e.g., Norris, 397 F.3d at 883; Kempner Mobile Elecs., Inc. v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys.,
428 F.3d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 2005); Montgomery County v. Microvote Corp., 320 F.3d 440, 445 (3d
Cir. 2003). The Sixth Circuit has also applied the dual standard of review, though earlier opinions
applied an abuse of discretion standard. Compare Bureau v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 129 F.
App'x 972, 974-75 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying abuse of discretion review to the district court's
weighing of the Daubert factors, but noting that "[t]he standard of review for whether the district
court abdicated its Daubert gatekeeping role.., is de novo"), with Jahn v. Equine Servs., PSC, 233
F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e must review [the] ruling that [the] proffered expert testimony
was inadmissible, and, even in the context of summary judgment, we review that decision for abuse
of discretion.").
287. Fuesting, 421 F.3d at 534-35.
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The appellate court found that the trial court had closely analyzed the
expert's credentials, but engaged in an incomplete and insufficient
analysis of the Daubert factors. 288 "To satisfy its essential role," the
Seventh Circuit stated, "the gatekeeper must do more than just make
conclusory statements., 289 The Seventh Circuit then applied the relevant
Daubert factors to find the testimony unreliable, as it was untested,
unpublished, based on an inadequate methodology to support the
expert's conclusion, formulated primarily for the purpose of litigation,
and did not adequately consider the alternative sterilization techniques
available at the time of the plaintiffs' surgery.29 °
2. Application of the Abuse of Discretion Standard
Circuit courts generally agree that a trial court abuses its discretion
when it completely fails to perform a reliability analysis. 29 1 In evaluating
whether a trial court has abused its discretion in admitting expert
testimony, several appellate courts go further by applying abuse of
discretion "with teeth," in which they closely examine the factors
applied by the trial court to determine whether it omitted a key factor,
improperly applied a factor, or inappropriately balanced the applied
factors. Courts show practical wisdom when they observe that the abuse
of discretion standard should not be applied to "render trial court
decisions impervious to scrutiny. 29 2 An abuse of discretion occurs when
a trial court commits a "meaningful error in judgment, ' '293 such as when
it ignores a material factor that deserves significant weight, improperly

288. See id. at 535.
289. Id.
290. See id at 535-37; see also Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 686-87 (7th Cir.
2002) (applying de novo review in a product liability case in which the plaintiffs husband was
electrocuted by current escaping from a kitchen range to reverse a district court's admission of the
plaintiffs expert's novel, untested, and unsubstantiated "resistive short" theory where the "court
conducted virtually no Daubert analysis"); cf Walker v. Soo Line R.R., 208 F.3d 581, 590 (7th Cir.
2000) (applying de novo review to find that the district court properly admitted expert testimony
offered by the defendant where the plaintiff argued that the court conducted only a cursory Daubert
hearing followed by an oral ruling).
291. See, e.g., Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., 299 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2000). But cf. Hangarter v. Provident Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004) (excusing a district court that failed to
apply Daubert,finding its factors inapplicable to the expert testimony at issue).
292. Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 83 (1st Cir. 1998).
293. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 923 (1st Cir. 1988)).
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relies upon a factor, or makes a serious mistake in weighing the
factors.294
Unfortunately, other appellate courts drain the core thrust of the
Daubert decision when they engage in a much more limited review of
the trial court's ruling, or at least rhetorically appear to provide more
substantial deference to trial courts in applying the abuse of discretion
standard. For example, in a case in which the Sixth Circuit reversed a
district court's exclusion of a differential diagnosis, the appellate court
characterized the abuse of discretion standard as "highly deferential,"
only allowing an overturning of the decision if "arbitrary, unjustifiable
or clearly unreasonable. 2 95 What signal does this send to trial courts that
may disagree with Daubert's gatekeeping role? The Eighth Circuit has
reversed evidentiary rulings "[o]nly if the expert's opinion is so
fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no assistance to the jury. 2 96
The Ninth Circuit similarly has required a "definite and firm conviction
that the district court committed a clear error of judgment" in admitting
the expert testimony.297 The Tenth Circuit has looked to whether the
district court's decision was "whimsical or manifestly unreasonable. 298
Such approaches can lead appellate courts to affirm the admission of
questionable expert testimony with little examination, communicating to
trial courts that something just short of whimsical is acceptable.2 99

294. Id.(citing Foster v. Mydas Assocs., Inc., 943 F.2d 139, 143 (1st Cir. 1991)); see also
Kempner Mobile Elecs., Inc., 428 F.3d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 2005); Dhillon v. Crown Controls Corp.,
269 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 2001).
295. Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255, 267 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Plain
Dealer Pub. Co. v. City of Lakewood, 794 F.2d 1139, 1148 (6th Cir. 1986)).
296. Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 929-30 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hose v. Chi.
Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1996)); see also id.at 932.
297. See, e.g., Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2003).
298. Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting At. Richfield Co.
v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 2000)); see also McKenzie v.
Benton, 388 F.3d 1342, 1351 (10th Cir. 2004) (granting "substantial deference to the district judge's
application of Daubert," and accepting Kumho's holding that trial judges must have "considerable
leeway").
299. See, e.g., Bonner, 259 F.3d. at 930-32 (affirming admission of medical testimony on the
cause of the plaintiffs neurological condition where defendant argued that there was no
epidemiological support for the expert's conclusion, that the expert did not determine the quantity of
the chemical to which the plaintiff was exposed or the threshold level for harm, and that he had
designed but not yet tested his theory, as well as affirming admission of testimony of a second
medical expert whose opinion was developed for litigation).
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V.

THE PROBLEM OF STATE COURTS THAT Do NOT FOLLOW
DAUBERT'S LETTER AND SPIRIT

Some state courts have followed the core, sound message of
Daubert, and their judges serve as gatekeepers against unsound expert
testimony. About half of the states have adopted the essential principles
of Daubert, either expressly or by implication. 300 These courts can
consider a wide range of factors to determine the reliability of expert
testimony. Fourteen states, including some of the most populous ones,
continue to apply the Frye "general acceptance test."'30 1 The challenge of
this eighty-year-old test is that it may exclude testimony about theories
that are reliable and based on sound science, but have not yet gained
general acceptance in the field, while allowing admission of theories that
have arguably gained general acceptance, yet have not been subject to
peer review or vigorous testing and may not fit the facts of the case.
Other states have adopted their own standards, or hybrids of the two
approaches, and conform to neither Daubert nor Frye.3 °2
In some states, the standard for determining reliability appears very
similar to the federal standard, but is interpreted and applied much less
stringently. This is the case in New Jersey, where, as evidence professor
David E. Bernstein, a leading expert in evidentiary law, has recognized,
"despite the [New Jersey] test's superficial similarity to Daubert and
Joiner, the New Jersey courts are known to be quite liberal about

300. See DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., FRYE/DAUBERT: A STATE REFERENCE GUIDE 3 (2005).
Jurisdictions adopting the principles of Daubert include Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See id. Some states may apply Daubert to
certain types of expert testimony, such as those seeking to speak on novel scientific evidence, but
not to other types of evidence. See, e.g., State v. Bowman, 89 P.3d 986, 993 (Mont. 2004).
301. Jurisdictions rejecting Daubertand continuing to follow the Frye general acceptance test
include Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Washington. DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., supra note 300, at 3.
302. Eight states apply their own standard for determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence, without expressly adopting or rejecting the principles of Daubert and its progeny,
including Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin. See id at 4. Some of these courts view the Daubert analysis
as "helpful," but do not follow it in every case. See, e.g., Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Manuilov, 742
N.E.2d 453, 461 n.5 (Ind. 2001); Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Iowa
1999). In addition, four states, Alabama, Nevada, Tennessee, and Virginia, have adopted a
combination of the Frye and Daubert standards. See DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., supra note 300, at
3. Tennessee has not expressly adopted Daubert, but has adopted a nearly identical approach that
could be considered even more stringent that Daubert. See McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955
S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997); DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., supra note 300, at 40.
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admitting expert scientific testimony in civil cases. 3 °3 Indeed, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has consistently reversed lower court rulings that
have excluded expert testimony of questionable reliability after a
thorough review.30 4 The same may be said about Louisiana, a state that
professes to follow Daubert,where, after closely examining state court
decisions between 2002 and 2004, Louisiana attorney J.E. Cullens, Jr.
concluded that "Daubert gatekeepers in Louisiana state courts seem
more like friendly doormen ....
There remains a clear gap between evidentiary standards in federal
court and state courts. This ignores the sound message of judges acting
as gatekeepers and, perhaps worse, is a clarion call to forum shopping
between federal and state courts. As Mr. Cullens recognized: "The
Daubert gate is undeniably more open in state court: ask the doorman
nicely to enter, and she should let you pass., 30 6 In 2004, the Lawyers for
Civil Justice ("LCJ") conducted three separate surveys of state court
experiences regarding the admissibility of expert evidence. The surveys
included responses from approximately 800 attorneys in 49 states. In
303. David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44
JURIMETRICS 351, 363-64 (2004); see also DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., supra note 300, at 30 ("New
Jersey courts are known to be quite liberal about admitting expert scientific testimony in civil
matters.").
304. See, e.g., Clark v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 845 A.2d 587, 599-601 (N.J. 2004) (reversing
exclusion of a research chemist's testimony on medical causation that went beyond the chemical
composition of the cleaner at issue, despite finding isolated statements problematic and noting that
the expert's opinion could have benefited from "more careful curbing"); Lindquist v. City of Jersey
City Fire Dep't, 814 A.2d 1069, 1074-75, 1078-79 (N.J. 2003) (reversing an intermediate appellate
court's ruling that the absence of studies demonstrating that firefighting can cause emphysema left
the plaintiffs expert without a credible foundation, and finding that New Jersey had adopted a
broader, less restrictive standard for proving causation in toxic tort litigation); Kemp ex rel. Wright
v. State, 809 A.2d 77, 81-82, 84-85, 89 (N.J. 2002) (reversing the exclusion of a medical expert's
opinion as unreliable when the trial and intermediate appellate courts had found an absence of
medical studies or reports establishing a causal connection between rubella vaccination during
pregnancy and congenital rubella syndrome ("CRS"), that the plaintiff could have been exposed to
the virus in the wild, and that a Center for Disease Control study confirmed that vaccination does
not cause CRS, and characterizing Daubert and New Jersey case law as "relax[ing] the standard for
the admissibility of scientific evidence"); Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1088 (N.J.
1992) (reversing exclusion of two witness's testimony: that of an epidemiologist, whose testimony
was deemed inadmissible because, not being a physician, he was deemed not qualified to testify that
asbestos exposure caused the plaintiffs colon cancer; and that of a second expert witness, a
physician who had never examined the decedent and did not account for other risk factors that could
have caused the cancer); Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 738, 747-48 (N.J. 1991)
(adopting a liberal standard for the admission of scientific evidence in toxic tort cases, and finding
that a trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a non-physician who sought to testify on
causation and present a theory that had not been "accepted by at least a substantial minority of the
applicable scientific community").
305. Cullens, supranote 28, at 352.
306. Id. at 356.
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stark contrast to the RAND study of federal court judges, the LCJ study
3 °7
By a
found that state court judges rarely excluded expert evidence.
three-to-one margin, respondents thought their state court judges were
not serving an appropriate "gatekeeper" function regarding the
admissibility of expert evidence.
Plaintiffs' lawyers recognize that Daubert sets a higher standard for
admissibility of expert testimony. For example, Senior Counsel Ned
Miltenberg of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (recently
renamed the American Association for Justice) has recognized that,
"[b]efore Daubert,federal courts rarely scrutinized the scientific validity
of expert opinion testimony in any kind of case and were particularly
reluctant to do so in civil cases. 3 °8 Mr. Miltenberg describes his strategy
to avoid Daubert:
In a nutshell, because it's difficult to see light at the end of the Daubert
tunnel, plaintiffs must take another tunnel. In fact, there are 51 other
tunnels, 51 other venues where lawsuits can be tried, and 51 other
jurisdictions where the odds against plaintiffs' experts and plaintiffs'
be worse than they are in federal court and... are
fortunes can30hardly
9
better.
often
As Mr. Miltenberg correctly observes, when Daubert is not applied,
"[p]laintiffs enjoy a greater chance of having a jury hear their experts
testify, and they are spared the considerable expense of conducting
3 10
When Daubert is not applied, "trial
endless admissibility hearings.,
of all proffered testimony. They
reliability
judges do not evaluate the
merely assess whether a restricted class of testimony is based on
'
3 11
Mr.
generally accepted principles and is therefore admissible."
Miltenberg advises plaintiffs' lawyers to file cases in states that continue
to apply the Frye "general acceptance" test and suggests they name3 12a
of the federal courts.
local defendant to avoid the diversity jurisdiction
Mr. Miltenberg, a very experienced plaintiffs' advocate, has issued a
not-so-subtle clarion call to his plaintiff-lawyer sisters and brothers:
Forum shop if you have a weak case on expert evidence. Mr. Miltenberg

307. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, STATE EVIDENCE REPORT ON COMBINED SURVEY
RESPONSES (Dec. 2004).
308. Ned Miltenberg, Out of the Fire and Into the Fryeing Pan or Back to the Future,TRIAL,
Mar. 2001, at 18, 19.
309. Id. at 23.
310. Id.at24.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 19, 25 n.35; see also Ned Miltenberg, How to Prevail in Daubert Challenges, 2
ATLA ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 2517, 2520-21 (2003).
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did not use those words, but that is the message that is heard, and it is a
practice that state or federal courts should discourage.
Regardless of whether a state follows Daubert, Frye, something in
between, or its own unique standard, trial court judges have the ability
and duty to guard against unreliable expert testimony.313 Expert
testimony requires a decision on admissibility that is very different from
other evidentiary issues, such as hearsay or privilege. General
background and experience, in the case of expert testimony, are
insufficient bases on which to make a determination of admissibility.
Each proffered expert presents a unique question as to his or her
qualifications, the reliability of the methodology employed, and the
conclusions that are reached. State judges who believe in fair justice
should require challenges to expert testimony to be briefed and argued
before trial, as they often may be outcome determinative and can disrupt
the jury if objections are presented in the midst of a trial. This is true for
witnesses presented by both plaintiff and defense counsel.
VI.

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
TORTS (THIRD): LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM SECTION 28,
COMMENT C: AN UNWISE BEACON FOR THE RETURN OF JUNK SCIENCE

The ALI is a highly regarded organization composed of prominent
judges, lawyers, and professors formed to promote the clarification and
simplification of the law. 3 14 One co-author of this Article is a lifetime
member and considers his tenure with ALl to be a great learning
experience. The ALI is probably best known to lawyers and jurists for its
publication of various Restatements, in which it "restates" the law in a
given area by reviewing case law and distilling it into a series of "black
letter" rules. These rules are "followed by explanatory 'Comments,'
which are, in turn, followed by 'Reporter's Notes,' which show the case
law basis" for the rules themselves. 1 5 The Restatements are not binding
on the courts, but are generally very persuasive. A current ALI project,
the "Restatement of the Law, Torts: Liability for Physical Harm"
("Physical Harm Restatement") may, however, unintentionally

313. See Michael Hoenig, Products Liability: Speculative, Unfounded Expert Opinions,
N.Y.L.J., July 10, 2006, at 3, 7 (recounting cases decided under New York law that demonstrate
how judges may exclude speculative expert testimony irrespective of Frye or Daubert).
314. For more information about ALl, see http://www.ali.org/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2007).
315. See Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability-The
American Law Institute's Process of Democracy and Deliberation, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 743, 743

(1998).
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encourage courts to admit unreliable expert31 6evidence, further draining
the crucial gatekeeping function of Daubert.
In that regard, section 28 of the Physical Harm Restatement sets
forth the uncontroversial principle that a plaintiff has the burden of proof
in showing that the defendant's tortious conduct was the cause of the
plaintiff's harm.3 17 It then provides that when the plaintiff claims that
multiple parties exposed him to a risk of physical harm, but he cannot
reasonably show which one of them caused the harm, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendants. 31 8 This is an unusual incursion on a
fundamental principle of evidence law: The plaintiff has the burden of
proof. It is also much more a rule of procedure than a substantive rule of
tort law, which has been for decades the province of the three
Restatements of the Law of Torts.
Comment C of section 28 drifts further away from the basics of
evidence rules about the burden of proof and provides a lengthy
discussion of evidentiary admissibility standards for causation in toxic
tort cases.3 19 It begins by observing the difficulties associated with
proving a causal connection between a substance and a specific disease,
and then side-steps Daubert's judicial gatekeeping function in
commenting that "[c]ausation is a question of fact normally left to the
jury, unless reasonable minds cannot differ., 320 Certainly, causation is a
question for the jury, but only after the judge, as a gatekeeper, has
considered the Daubert factors and found the proposed expert testimony
both relevant and reliable.
The comment goes on to minimize the Daubert line of cases by
referring to them as "some courts" making decisions in "[a] few
celebrated cases. 32 1 What the commentary does not make clear is that
Daubert is established, well-reasoned, and respected law today in most
federal courts. While application may vary in each circuit, the
gatekeeper function is widely accepted, as countless decisions interpret
and apply Daubert'sjudicial gatekeeping function. In addition, Daubert,
and cases after it, did not announce a "blanket rule" as the comment
suggests. Instead, it set forth several factors for courts to consider in
measuring the admissibility of expert testimony. By glossing over a

316. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1 2005).

317. Id. § 28(a).
318.
319.

Id. § 28(b).
See id. § 28(a) cmt. c.

320. Id. § 28 cmt. c(l).
321.

Id.
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substantial body of procedural law, the comment may confuse courts
about the current state of the law governing admission of expert witness
testimony.
Moreover, comment C suggests that, in at least two instances,
admissibility standards should be relaxed. It observes that epidemiologic
evidence is sometimes unavailable, costly, and time consuming. 322 For
this reason, it favors an approach that forgives the lack of epidemiologic
evidence on grounds that "some plaintiffs may be forced to litigate long
before epidemiologic research is available." 323 As discussed earlier,
however, scientists generally consider epidemiology "the best evidence
of general causation in a toxic tort case. 3 24 Although there may be
reasons why such evidence has not developed, unavailability is an
insufficient basis on which to do away with legitimate criteria and hold a
defendant liable for a harm it did not cause.
In addition, the Physical Harm Restatement commentary suggests
that general causation can be excused so long as there is a "reasonable
explanation for the lack of general-causation evidence." 32 5 Under this
approach, plaintiffs would be allowed, in fact, encouraged, to bring
premature causes of action against defendant manufacturers without any
evidence that defendant's product is capable of causing plaintiffs
ailment.
In a similar draining of basic science, the comment states that
occasionally "general and specific causation issues may merge into a
single inquiry. 3 26 This is fundamentally incorrect. General causation
addresses whether the agent is capable of causing harm; specific
causation addresses whether the agent in fact did cause the harm to the
individual at issue. Since each calls for a separate analysis, it would take
more than the fabled magician Houdini to show how the two could
harmoniously merge into one inquiry. In fact, cases after Daubert
recognize general and specific causation as two distinct tests that must
be separately considered. These courts require that a "[p]laintiff must
first demonstrate general causation because without general causation,
there can be no specific causation., 327 In other words, if a product or
substance is incapable of causing a certain injury in anyone, it follows
322. Id. § 28 cmt. c(3).
323. Id.
324. Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005); see also supra
note 207.
325. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(4) (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1 2005).
326. Id. § 28 cmt. c(l).
327. Norris, 397 F.3d at 881.
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or substance could not have caused
even more strongly that that product
328
a specific injury to the plaintiff.

Not only is comment C misplaced, since it has little to do with
section 28 ("Burden of Proof"), which it purports to expound, but also it
minimizes a substantial body of law stemming from Daubert and
loosens general and specific causation requirements to such an extent
that they are rendered meaningless. If the Physical Harm Restatement
was adopted and this comment followed, it could move courts toward to
a pre-Daubert era, where unsupported expert testimony would be
permissible, and juries could be inundated with junk science.
Although Restatements are not binding on courts, they are lauded
as compelling secondary authority. Since some courts have misapplied
the Daubert test by draining it of meaning, it is particularly important
that the Restatement correctly reflects the current state of the law.
Otherwise, judges in already confused jurisdictions may fail to give
Daubert sufficient weight and may serve as inadequate gatekeepers.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The "battle of experts" continues in full force today. The need for
Daubert protections is as great, if not more so, as it was twenty years
ago. As Justice Breyer has recognized: "[T]here is an increasingly
32 9 Overall, federal and
important need for law to reflect sound science.
state courts have followed Daubert's guidance and satisfied that need.
There are five general areas, however, where courts have in some cases
drained Daubert of its meaning: (1) failure to apply the closer fit test for
relevance; (2) misinterpretation of their flexibility in applying Daubert
to the point of abdication; (3) admission of expert conclusions that do
not flow from the methodology; (4) disparate application of Daubert
hearings; and (5) application of varying standards of review. In order to
prevent forum shopping and encourage consistency and predictability,
both federal and state court judges should carefully adhere to the
"gatekeeping" function outlined in Daubert, and avoid decisions that
drain Daubert of its logic, sound science, and meaning.

328. See id
329. Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 280 SCi. 537, 538 (1998).
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